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INTRODUCTION
The fiscal crisis of 2008 revealed manifold weaknesses in national
financial regulatory frameworks. Many jurisdictions have made legis-
lative efforts to address these flaws, with varying degrees of promise
and success.' The United States has been through this process before,
most recently in the wake of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s,2
and before that, in the aftermath of the stock market crash of 1929. 3
Both crises afforded Congress the opportunity to make landmark
changes to the U.S. financial regulatory architecture, most of which
have strengthened and safeguarded U.S. markets. 4 Although some of
the changes had international dimensions, prompting agencies to in-
teract more frequently with their foreign counterparts, the traditional
focus of financial regulatory reform efforts has been domestic. 5
I For a discussion of one of the United States' largest legislative efforts to fix finan-
cial regulation, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank Act), as well as the Act's principal weaknesses, see generally Edward F. Greene, Dodd-
Frank: A Lesson in Decision Avoidance, 6 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 29 (2011).
2 See Barry Meier, The Bailout Handbook: The Savings and Loan Crisis 19 Years Ago May
Be Instructive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at Cl; Jack Willoughby, The Lessons of the Savings-
and-Loan Crisis: An Interview with William Black, BARRON'S (Apr. 13, 2009), http://online.
barrons.com/article/SB1 23940701204709985.html#articleTabs-panel-article%3D1.
3 See, e.g., Michael Liedtke, Bank Investment Plan Is More Depression Dea Vu, USA To-
DAY (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-10-14-1 4 90 3 21705-
x.htm (discussing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a Depression-era agency, and
its relation to the current crisis).
4 For example, following the 1929 market crash, Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall
Act and created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to prevent such a crisis from
repeating itself. See Thomas G. Fischer et al., The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV. 467, 472-74 (1984). These changes have
been credited for the then-unprecedented stretch of banking stability that lasted until the
mid-1980s. See RICHARD ScoTr CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTI-
TUTIONS 20 (4th ed. 2009).
5 For instance, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(FDICIA), a centerpiece of Congress's response to the 1980s savings and loan crisis, ex-
panded U.S. banking regulations and prudential examinations to branches of foreign
banks but was principally focused on reforming the Federal Deposit Insurance CorFora-
tion's (FDIC) domestic authorities. Most importandy, it increased the FDIC's ability to
borrow from the U.S. Treasury, mandated the FDIC "to set risk-based deposit insurance
premiums," and required a prompt-corrective-action and least-cost-resolution approach for
failing banks. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 30; L. Todd Gibson, The Foreign Bank
Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991: Short Run Consequences En Route to the Long Term Goal 27
CASE W. REs.J. IN-r'L L. 119, 126, 128 (1995) (explaining that Congress passed the Foreign
Bank Supervision Enhancement Act, which expanded U.S. regulatory supervision over U.S.
branches of foreign banks, as Title II of the FDICIA).
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This domestic approach will no longer suffice. The 2008 crisis
revealed that financial activity has now so thoroughly outstripped na-
tional borders as to demand an international approach to regulatory
reform. A prime example of the need for an international approach
is the downfall of Lehman Brothers and AIG. Lehman Brothers' cata-
strophic failure not only exposed the lack of coordination and resolu-
tion planning among national regulators6 but also the basic inability
of national bankruptcy regimes to deal with complex financial organi-
zations of global scope. 7 AIG's descent derived from concern that if
AIG could not meet its obligations on the credit-default swaps (CDS)
it had issued, financial institutions around the world would have to
sell off securities en masse to remain adequately capitalized. 8 This
same concern also formed the core rationale for the U.S. govern-
ment's decision to give billions of dollars of financial support to AIG.9
Neither regulators nor market participants had any picture of the ex-
tent to which CDS liabilities were woven throughout the system be-
cause they were almost entirely unregulated and traded over the
counter.10 Further, the crash of 2008 revealed both the systemic im-
portance and the under-regulation of the so-called "shadow banking"
system, in which nondepository institutions conduct bank-like activi-
ties1' that expose them to similar run-risks as banks while not being
regulated as such.1 2
Lehman and AIG are just the most prominent examples from the
2008 crisis of the need to enhance and deepen coordination among
financial regulators and to harmonize policies across borders. This
widespread need for greater international regulatory coordination
was not lost on policymakers, who quickly began exploring solutions
to address the problem. G-20 finance ministers agreed to a communi-
qu6 at the Pittsburgh Summit in the fall of 2009 that laid out a com-
prehensive set of commitments for policy coordination across the
6 See ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF How WALL STREET
AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM-AND THEMSELVES 357-66
(2010).
7 See, e.g., Jamie Altman, Comment, A Test Case in International Bankruptcy Protocols:
The Lehman Brothers Insolvency, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 463, 465-67 (2011) (discussing the
need for international protocols in Lehman's bankruptcy).
8 See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Behind AIG's Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-World
Test, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2008, at Al.
9 See id.
10 See Nathaniel G. Dutt, Current United States Credit Default Swap Regulatory Initiatives: A
New World Standard or Just a Ploy?, 16 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMp. L. 169, 170 (2009).
11 These bank-like activities are generally a form of short-term borrowing to finance
long-term assets.
12 Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of
Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1683, 1717-18 (2011).
2012] 1085
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
financial regulatory spectrum. 13 The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (Basel Committee) set to work on a number of multilat-
eral initiatives, including a third iteration of capital standards.1 4 Addi-
tionally, the Financial Stability Forum, given new powers and
responsibilities by the G-20 and renamed the Financial Stability Board
(FSB), began to take the lead in coordinating regulatory reforms
across a range of critical areas. 15
But this early promise of a political commitment to meaningful
international cooperation has not resolved the underlying coordina-
tion problems. For example, the G-20 approach relies on national
regulators and legislators to implement the agreed common set of
standards, and even though the FSB and the Basel Committee have
fleshed out the agreed G-20 principles, they still must rely on national
implementation.1 6 Thus, while these supranational bodies formulate
regulatory reforms, they can do nothing more than "name-and-
shame" states that fail to implement the agreed regulatory policies.1 7
As this Article will demonstrate, the current informal approach
has already yielded substantial and troubling divergences, and will not
be sufficient to safeguard the global capital markets from future cri-
ses. The widespread reluctance to engage in more formal arrange-
ments to reform the global financial regulatory architecture is
attributable to concerns over sovereignty, as independent nations do
not wish to cede oversight to international bodies. Such a nonbinding
approach, however, is not without consequences. The experience of
2008 illustrated that in a world of free capital flows and too-big-to-fail
institutions, the impact of ineffective financial regulation emanates far
beyond national borders and is thus legitimately a matter of multilat-
eral concern.
Further, the inadequacy of an entirely soft-law approach does not
mean that the only alternative is a global, all-powerful administrative
body. A central goal of this Article is to show that a "one-size-fits-all"
legal approach to coordinating international regulatory reform will
not suffice-in some areas informal measures will work, while others
call for formal arrangements among critical markets. Specifically,
building a sustainable mutual recognition framework may be an ideal
13 G-20, Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit (Sept. 24-25, 2009), http://online.
wsj.com/public/resources/documents/g20-statement-09252009.pdf.
14 Press Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Initiatives in Response to the Crisis by the
Basel Committee (Mar. 30, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p090330.htm.
15 Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., Financial Stability Board Reports to G20 Leaders
on Progress in Implementing Financial Regulatory Reforms (Nov. 4, 2011) [hereinafter
FSB, FSB Reports to G20 Leaders], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
press/pr_ 1 1104ff.pdf.
16 Cf Brooke Masters, Countries Fail to Enact Basel Banking Reforms, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 19,
2011, at 5.
17 Cf id.
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way to resolve international coordination problems in a number of
regulatory fields, most importantly over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives.' 8
For global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs),
where active oversight and prompt enforcement are indispensable,
only deeper and binding efforts can ensure effective supervision, re-
covery, and resolution. 19 The time-sensitive, high-pressure context of
recovery and resolution for G-SIFIs magnifies the probability that even
small divergences in rules or procedures could hinder international
cooperation. Likewise, it is essential to establish a formal structure for
prudential supervision of G-SIFIs, with active coordination and the
maximum degree of information sharing, to help ensure that coun-
tries will timely address undue risks and deficiencies. While there is
no need to incorporate binding agreements on capital and liquidity
measures due to the fact that major jurisdictions have committed to
implementing Basel III into their national law, 20 the financial commu-
nity must still monitor and remedy corner cutting in the complex
methodologies used in those areas of regulation and understand the
potential consequences posed by jurisdictions that wish to go beyond
Basel III and adopt enhanced standards.
Accordingly, we advocate a treaty-based system, based at the FSB,
for the cooperative supervision and resolution of G-SIFIs. 2t Such a
system would give formal legal status to firm-specific cooperation
agreements negotiated by home and host supervisors of each G-SIFI,
create an institutional home at the FSB for colleges of supervisors, 22
18 Although not covered within the scope of this Article, the regulation of credit-
rating agencies is another important area in which mutual recognition would likely be the
best way to facilitate international coordination.
19 G-SIFIs are global financial institutions "whose distress or disorderly failure, be-
cause of their size, complexity and systematic interconnectedness, would cause significant
disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity." See FIN. STABILITY BD.,
POLICY MEASURES TO ADDRESS SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS I (Nov.
2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_l 1 104bb.pdf.
20 For a list of the most recent status of Basel III adoption, see BASEL COMM. ON BANK-
INC SUPERVISION, Bank for Int'l Settlements, PROGRESS REPORT ON BASEL III IMPLEMENTA-
TION (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter PROGRESS REPORT ON BASEL III IMPLEMENTATION], available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs203.pdf.
21 The FSB first identified a list of 29 G-SIFIs in November 2011; it intends to revise
and update the list each successive November. See Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., FSB
Announces Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions
(SIFIs) and Names Initial Group of Global SIFIs (Nov. 4, 2011), available at http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/prj- 11 104cc.pdf.
22 Currently, supervisory colleges are relatively informal in nature, functioning as
"multilateral working groups of relevant supervisors that are formed for the collective pur-
pose of enhancing effective consolidated supervision of an international banking group on
an ongoing basis." BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
GOOD PRACTICE PRINCIPLES ON SUPERVISORY COLLEGES 1 n.1 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter BASEL
PRINCIPLES ON SUPERVISORY COLLEGES], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl77.pdf.
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and set forth procedures for routinely sharing supervisory information
and conducting joint analyses. The system would also require cooper-
ation agreements to delineate each national authority's responsibili-
ties in various adverse scenarios, with particular detail on early
intervention (i.e., when certain capital or liquidity thresholds are
crossed), resolution processes, 23 and associated funding needs. Ide-
ally, these agreements would provide that resolutions-if necessary-
be led by the home authority on a group-wide basis.
But there may well be situations where the home and host author-
ities disagree on when to execute the agreed steps or on whether un-
foreseen circumstances should necessitate departures from the
agreement. Accordingly, to ensure compliance and to instill market
confidence in the global regulatory oversight of G-SIFIs, key jurisdic-
tions should also empower the FSB with a dispute resolution mecha-
nism for hearing disagreements among relevant supervisors and
issuing legally binding orders for coordinated action, on potentially
very short notice. Finally, the FSB treaty framework should include an
independent mechanism to validate and report on the processes used
by national supervisors and financial institutions to measure capital
and liquidity. This mechanism would look beyond institutions' regu-
lar audited statements and assess whether underlying methodologies
are consistent with the new Basel III accords.
This framework is not a fanciful, impractical idea. In fact, a num-
ber of G-SIFIs and banking associations have already called for bind-
ing international measures on resolution authority.24  Further,
23 Although delineating the role of a G-SIFI's resolution authority-for instance, by
establishing that the home authority shall direct the group-wide resolution of the G-SIFI-
in a binding cooperation agreement is an important first step, we also believe that key
jurisdictions should consider adopting a model law to ensure harmonization at the na-
tional level. This model law would be along the lines of the work of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in cross-border corporate insol-
vency. See LEGAL AND MONETARY AND CAPITAL MKTS. DEP'TS, INT'L MONETARY FUND, RESO-
LUTION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKS-A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCED COORDINATION
17 (June 2010) [hereinafter IMF, RESOLUTION OF CROSS-BORDER BANiGS], available at http:/
/www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/061 110.pdf. If broadly adopted, this would al-
low a failed G-SIFI to gain recognition of its "main" proceeding (i.e., in the home jurisdic-
tion) in all other countries where it had branches or subsidiaries. As described further in
Part II, infra, this model law would help ensure that potentially unforeseen or underesti-
mated conflicts between national resolution regimes would not hinder the execution of
cooperation agreements for G-SIFI resolution.
24 See Comments Received on the ESB Consultative Document on Effective Resolutions of S1FIs,
FSB, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/c 10909.htm (last visited Apr. 16,
2012). Of the eight G-SIFIs that submitted comments to the FSB, BNP Paribas, Deutsche
Bank, Santander, UBS, and Unicredit expressly called for some form of legally binding
arrangement for resolution authority. See id. Bank of China and HSBC did not address the
issue, and Credit Suisse noted that international coordination "should be stronger than
outlined in the consultation paper." See Credit Suisse, Comments on the Consultative Docu-
ment: Effective Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions 6 (Sept. 2011), available
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/c-ll0909p.pdf. Two large but non-G-SIFI
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allowing the United States and other major economies to take these
steps would not be an unacceptable infringement of sovereignty. The
United States has recognized the importance of such commitments in
international trade, as evidenced by its support of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and willingness to work out contentious issues
within the WTO's framework. 25 International cooperation in finan-
cial regulation is no less critical.
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I addresses the suprana-
tional mechanisms that have been set up to coordinate global finan-
cial regulatory reform and provides an overview of key national efforts
in that respect. Part II discusses three primary areas that demand in-
ternational cooperation: (1) supervision, recovery, and resolution of
G-SIFIs; (2) capital and liquidity adequacy; and (3) OTC derivatives,
illustrating the approaches taken in major jurisdictions and the ten-
sions that have emerged. Part III highlights legal and policy implica-
tions from the preceding discussion, demonstrating the varying extent
to which binding legal arrangements are needed to ensure effective
international cooperation.
I
OVERVIEW OF KEY INSTITUTIONS AND JURISDICTIONS IN
REGULATORY REFORM
A. Supranational Frameworks
The G-20 group of industrialized and major industrializing coun-
tries was created in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in the
late 1990s and serves as a forum for finance-minister level coordina-
tion of economic policy.26 Since 2009, the G-20 has been the core
forum for coordinating international financial policy, supplanting the
banks, Standard Chartered and Intesa Sanpaolo, also commented and both recommended
a legally binding approach. See Comments Received on the FSB Consultative Document on Effec-
tive Resolutions of S1Is, supra.
25 See, e.g., Bruce Wilson, Compliance by WfO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Rulings: The Record to Date, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 397, 400 (2007) (remarking on the
United States' compliance record with the WTO). Although the WTO Agreement was not
ratified in the United States as a treaty, Congress passed it as a "congressional-executive"
agreement and is U.S. federal law. In fact, any binding U.S. international agreement on
financial regulation would likely also be adopted through a congressional-executive agree-
ment rather than a treaty, as this is historically how Congress treats economic-related
agreements to which the United States is a party, such as the IMF and World Bank. See
Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 215-16 (2d ed.
1996); JEANNE J. GRiMMET, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-896, WHY CERTAIN TRADE AGREE-
MENTS ARE APPROVED AS CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN As TREATIES
1 (2004).
26 The Origins and Evolution of the G-20, G20.ORG, http://www.g20.org/en/g20/the-
origins-and-evolution-of-the-g20 (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). G-20 members include Argen-
tina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the
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G-7 in that role. 27 The policy coordination involved in this task re-
quires periodic summits between top leaders such as presidents and
prime ministers-not just between finance ministers as before-un-
derscoring the member countries' determination that their top politi-
cal figures pay attention to key financial issues. 28 At the Pittsburgh
summit in 2009, leaders of the G-20 established a framework for
strengthening the international financial regulatory system. They de-
termined that finance ministers and central bank governors should
agree on common standards in the following critical areas:
* building high quality capital and mitigating procyclicality;
* reforming compensation practices to support financial stability;
* improving the regulation of OTC derivatives markets;
* addressing cross-border resolutions of systemically important fi-
nancial institutions;
* achieving a single set of high quality, global accounting stan-
dards; and
* continuing to combat noncooperative jurisdictions (i.e., with re-
spect to tax havens, money laundering, corruption, and terrorist
financing) .29
While the G-20 formulates such policy decisions, it outsources a
great deal of its monitoring and implementation responsibilities to
the FSB, which the G-20 created at its summit in London in April
2009.30 The G-20's express goal in creating the FSB was to "coordi-
nate at the international level the work of national financial authori-
ties and international standard setting bodies [ ] in order to develop
and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory
and other financial sector policies." 1 Members of the FSB include
central banks and finance ministries from most G-20 countries, several
EU institutions, and a number of prominent international organiza-
tions and standard-setting bodies.32 U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner, in highlighting the FSB's importance among supranational
institutions, dubbed it the "fourth pillar" of the global economic gov-
United States, and the European Union. Members, G20.ORG, http://www.g20.org/index.
php/en/g20/members (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
27 Duncan Alford, Supervisoy Colleges: The Global Financial Crisis and Improving Interna-
tional Supervisory Coordination, 24 EMORy INT'L L. REv. 57, 76 (2010).
28 See id. at 75.
29 G-20, Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, supra note 13, at 8-10. This list is a
representative, but not comprehensive, reproduction of all areas the G-20 identified as
important.
30 The G-20 did not create the FSB from scratch. Rather, the FSB replaced a previ-
ously existing organization known as the Financial Stability Forum, and it was given an
expanded mandate in coordinating and monitoring G-20 member states' implementation
of commitments made in financial regulatory reform. Alford, supra note 27, at 75.
31 FSB Charter art. 1, available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publica
tions/r_090925d.pdf. For a list of FSB members, see id. at Annex A.
32 Id.; see also Alford, supra note 27, at 75 (discussing the formation of the FSB).
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ernance framework-the other three pillars being the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the WTO. 3 The man-
date of the FSB is:
" to assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system and iden-
tify and oversee action needed to address them;
* to promote co-ordination and information exchange among au-
thorities responsible for financial stability;
" to monitor and advise on market developments and their impli-
cations for regulatory policy;
* to advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory
standards;
* to undertake joint strategic reviews of the policy development
work of the international standard setting bodies to ensure their
work is timely, coordinated, focused on priorities, and address-
ing gaps;
* to set guidelines for and support the establishment of supervi-
sory colleges;
* to manage contingency planning for cross-border crisis manage-
ment, particularly with respect to systemically important firms;
and
* to collaborate with the IMF to conduct Early Warning
Exercises. 34
Since its creation, the FSB has been very active in formulating stan-
dards and frameworks, coordinating with standard-setting bodies,
monitoring member state implementation, and reporting regularly to
the G-20 across the full spectrum of financial regulatory issues.3 5
However, the only real penalty for noncompliance with FSB efforts is
"naming-and-shaming" through FSB-conducted progress reports and
peer and sector reviews. 36
33 Regaining Their Balance: A New Chapter for the World Economy, Maybe, ECONOMIST
(Sept. 26, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/14530394.
34 Mandate, FSB, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/mandate.htm (last
visited Apr. 16, 2012).
35 See, e.g., FSB, FSB Reports to G20 Leaders, supra note 15. Aside from the FSB and
the Basel Committee, which is also discussed at length in this Article, other standard-set-
ting bodies and transnational networks participating in financial regulatory reform include
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (securities regulation), the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (corporate governance) and the
International Monetary Fund (financial stability and other macroeconomic issues).
36 The FSB's ongoing efforts to promote global standards on international coopera-
tion and information exchange illustrate how this works. The FSB began its initiative in
March 2010, and in its April 2011 progress report noted that "[a) 11 but a few of the jurisdic-
tions" contacted by the FSB "already demonstrate sufficiently strong adherence to the rele-
vant standards or are implementing reforms to strengthen their adherence." Fin. Stability
Bd., Promoting Global Adherence to Regulatory and Supervisory Standards on International Coopera-
tion and Information Exchange: Progress Report 1 (Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_l 10429.pdf. At the same time, the FSB
stated that "[a] very small number ofjurisdictions" had not "cooperated satisfactorily," and
that it intended to publish a list of those jurisdictions to induce compliance. See id. at 3-4.
2012] 1091
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While the FSB takes the leading role among transnational net-
works in coordinating most areas of regulatory reform, the Basel Com-
mittee continues to have a preeminent position in setting capital and
liquidity standards for banks worldwide.37 Like the FSB, the Basel
Committee does not have any formal supervisory or legal power over
its members or other states but rather helps formulate guidelines and
best practice recommendations "in the expectation that individual au-
thorities will take steps to implement them through detailed arrange-
ments-statutory or otherwise-which are best suited to their own
national systems."3 8 The Basel Committee reports to central bank gov-
ernors and heads of supervision of member countries and has four
main working groups.39 It is now working on its third iteration of cap-
ital standards, known as Basel III, which substantially increases mini-
mum ratios and places more emphasis on common equity buffers
than did its predecessor, Basel 11.40 Basel III's development is partly
in response to criticism that Basel II played a substantial role in al-
37 The Basel Committee is also complementing the FSB's work in certain areas be-
yond capital, using a similar approach of formulating core standards and monitoring the
efforts of national authorities to converge to those standards. Notably, the Basel Commit-
tee's cross-border bank resolution group has made recommendations on model cross-bor-
der resolution frameworks and followed up with a report on how jurisdictions are
progressing with respect to those recommendations. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVI-
SION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, RESOLUTION POLICIES AND FRAMEWORS-PROGRESS So
FAR 31-35 (July 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs200.pdf. It has also made
recommendations regarding best practices for supervisory colleges, as will be discussed
later in this Article. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
38 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, History of the Basel Committee and Its Member-
ship, BANK FOR INT'L SETrLEMENrS 1 (Aug. 2009), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf.
39 These include an accounting task force, a standards implementation group, a pol-
icy development group, and a consultative group (which reaches out to nonmembers on
Basel initiatives, among other roles). About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT'L SErrLE-
MENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
40 International Regulatory Framework for Banks (Basel III), BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). The Basel Committee
issued the first iteration of its Basel Capital Accord in 1988, which called for banks to
implement credit risk management frameworks with a minimum capital level of 8%. PRO-
GRESS REPORT ON BASEL III IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 20. Essentially all countries-and
not just members-with internationally active banks have now adopted this minimum
level. Patricia Jackson et al., Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basle
Accord 1 (Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, Working Paper No. 1, 1999), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs-wpl.pdf. The Basel Committee issued the second iteration
of Basel standards, known as Basel II, in 1999. See PROGRESS REPORT ON BASEL III IMPLEMEN-
TATION, supra note 20. Basel II differed from Basel I in its greater reliance on banks' own
risk metrics through a mechanism known as "Advanced Approaches," used as a supple-
ment to supervisors' determination of risk-weighted capital requirements. See id.; Basel II-
Advanced Approaches, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.occ.gov/
topics/capital-policy/baselii-advanced-approaches/index-basel-ii.html (last visited Apr. 16,
2012).
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lowing global financial institutions to become overleveraged during
the run-up to the financial crisis.41
B. The United States
Over a year and a half after the financial crisis commenced in the
fall of 2008, the U.S. Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act,4 2 the most
significant legislation on financial regulatory reform since the Great
Depression. 43 In Dodd-Frank, Congress delegated a number of key
decisions to regulatory agencies for implementation. 44 While it is
common for Congress to make such delegations, especially in particu-
larly technical or fast-changing areas that are best handled by agencies
(which generally have greater expertise and flexibility than Congress),
Dodd-Frank was overly reliant on this practice. From the standpoint
of international coordination, this is troublesome for at least three
reasons.
First, in many cases Dodd-Frank places key decisions in the hands
of the very same regulators whose critical oversights and failures con-
tributed to the crisis. The Act also requires close cooperation among
these regulators, despite the fact that many of them have a long-stand-
ing record of rivalry and turf battles.45 Second, Dodd-Frank creates a
rushed and inflexible U.S. regulatory reform process that could dis-
rupt efforts to coordinate policy with foreign counterparts. Agencies
must go through a lengthy "notice and comment" process before
promulgating final rules, governed closely by the United States' Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA).46 The simultaneous need to com-
ply with the detailed requirements of the APA and to stay up-to-date
with Dodd-Frank's aggressive timelines has created an overwhelming
burden on U.S. agencies, and this burden likely hinders their ability
to engage in meaningful consultation with foreign regulators during
41 See Financial Regulatoy Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Fin. Sews., 112th Cong. app. at 70 (2011) [hereinafter Financial Regulatory Reform Hear-
ing] (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/112-39.pdf.
42 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-230, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18,
22, 31, and 41 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2010)).
43 See generally Alert Memorandum from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Dodd
Frank: One Year Later-Key Current Issues for Financial Institutions pmbl. (July 27, 2011)
[hereinafter Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo], available at http://www.cgsh.com/
News/Search.aspx (search "one year later"; then follow title link under "Alert Memo-
randa") .
44 Cf id. at I (discussing the pressure regulators face from Capitol Hill to "address
complex issues" and "implement ambiguous statutory provisions").
45 See Greene, supra note 1, at 1.
46 See generally Jill Nylander, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Public Policy Perspective,
MICH. B.J., Nov. 2006, at 38, 39, available at http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/
pdf4article1078.pdf (discussing the steps involved in the notice and comment process).
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the rulemaking process.47 Third, to the extent that the United States
must forge ahead and finalize rules pursuant to this process, it consist-
ently puts the EU and other countries in a "take-it-or-leave-it" position
with respect to streamlining their policies with the United States.
Partly as a result of the incredible burdens on U.S. agencies and
the time pressures resulting from Dodd-Frank, the U.S. courts' re-
sponse to such hastily formulated rules is uncertain-they may decide
to strike down these rules on the grounds that agencies did not follow
either the APA or Dodd-Frank's procedural requirements for a given
provision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has already
made several such rulings, most recently inJuly 2011 when it held that
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had not done a full
cost-benefit analysis on a proxy access rule that it promulgated under
Dodd-Frank.48 Judge Douglas Ginsburg lambasted the SEC in that
case, finding that the agency "inconsistently and opportunistically
framed the costs and benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify
the certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be quantified;
neglected to support its predictive judgments; contradicted itself; and
failed to respond to substantial problems raised by commenters. 49
Should additional rules prove vulnerable to judicial challenge, a shift-
ing, unpredictable landscape could emerge for international coordi-
nation of regulatory reform.
On an organizational level, Dodd-Frank has not only failed to
consolidate the already fragmented U.S. regulatory system, but it has
also contributed to its further fragmentation, creating several new ma-
jor bodies-the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)-within the Federal
Reserve Board (FRB), while eliminating only one-the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS). 5 These agencies supplement the SEC, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFI'C), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the FRB, and the FDIC as the
principal federal financial regulators in the United States. To compli-
cate matters further, Dodd-Frank also limits the power of federal
agencies to preempt state agencies and attorneys general in certain
47 See Promoting Economic Recovery and Job Creation: The Road Forward: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 102 app. at 102 (2011) (prepared statement of Hal S.
Scott, Nomura Professor of International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School) available
at http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/112-1.pdf (arguing that Dodd-Frank
mandates and pressure have resulted in agencies "abandoning their responsible, delibera-
tive rulemaking processes," thus leaving the public and interested parties without sufficient
opportunity to comment).
48 See Jesse Hamilton & Joshua Gallu, Dodd-Frank Rules May Be at Legal Risk After SEC
Loses U.S. Court Appeal BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
201 1-07-22/dodd-frank-acts-ruies-may-be-at-Iegal-risk-after-sec-appeals-court-defeat.htm.
49 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
50 See Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 1, 4.
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areas of regulation.51 Taken together, these developments in U.S. fi-
nancial regulation make for an intriguing inverse of Henry Kissinger's
famous statement as U.S. Secretary of State in the 1970s: "If I want to
call Europe, who do I call?" 52 Today, European regulators would be
forgiven for expressing similar confusion when determining how to
coordinate their reforms across America's multitude of agencies.
C. The European Union
Within the European Union, financial regulatory policy at the su-
pranational level has dramatically centralized since the global credit
crisis. Traditionally, financial regulation has been handled almost en-
tirely within and by member states of the EU. 53 But now, in terms of
EU-level policymaking, the European Commission (EC) has taken the
lead role. Pursuant to the Lamfalussy Process, the EC's Directorate
for Internal Market and Services (DG Markt) is responsible for
promulgating EU directives in the area of financial reform, which, af-
ter approval from the European Council and Parliament, must be im-
plemented by EU member states. 54 In March 2009, the EC set forth a
comprehensive blueprint for a reform agenda, drawing heavily on the
findings of an expert panel-chaired by former IMF Managing Direc-
tor Jacques de Larosiere-that had investigated financial regulatory
51 See id. at 69.
52 James Meek, What Is Europe, GUARDIAN (London) (Dec. 16, 2004), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/dec/17/eu.turkeyl.
53 Cf MYRIAMI VANDER STICHELE, SOMO, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: MAPPING EU DECISION MAKING STRUCTURES ON FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVI-
SION 6 (2008), available at http://www.eurodad.org/uploadedFiles/WhatsNew/Reports/
EUMappingFinancial RegulationFINAL.pdf ("Major European governments have been
promoting a strong liberalisation and deregulation of financial markets at both European
and international levels with the belief that this would strengthen European economic and
monetary policies. They now recognise the problem of insufficient coordination between
European supervisors and between European governments and regulators.").
54 See Lamfalussy, FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/International/eu-
ropean/lamfalussy/index.shtml (last updated Feb. 10, 2012). The EU established the
Lamfalussy Process in 2001 to allow for greater convergence and coordination in EU finan-
cial regulation. It is a four-step process. In the first step, the EC proposes legislation that
must be adopted by codecision with the European Council and Parliament, with the legis-
lation (either directive or regulation) specifying how and whether power should be dele-
gated to the EC for implementing measures. Assuming such delegations are made, the
second step consists of the EC drafting and adopting secondary legislation in consultation
with the relevant European Supervisory Authority (ESA) bodies. In the third step, the
ESAs advise the EC on when and whether it is setting forth more detailed guidance, and
undertake consultation with interested market participants as applicable. The fourth step
involves monitoring and enforcement by the EC, which is responsible for ensuring that EU
legislation is transposed into domestic law and properly applied by member states. See id.
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shortcomings in the EU.55 This EC blueprint continues to guide the
broader European effort in regulatory reform.
Although the EU is still formally a federation of twenty-seven sov-
ereign states, DG Markt and its Commissioner, Michel Barnier, form a
principal point of contact for the EU in coordinating financial regula-
tion with foreign counterparts. This unified approach contrasts with
America's array of independent agencies, as described above. To be
sure, Barnier has established a channel of communication with the
U.S. Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, and the two officials have
already exchanged several public missives on their respective concerns
over their jurisdictions' interaction in the reform process. 56 But
Geithner's ability to influence the rulemaking processes of the various
U.S. agencies, which possess a great deal of independence within the
U.S. executive branch, is limited, especially when compared to the
EC's authority. While European member states generally have some
degree of flexibility in determining how to implement an EC direc-
tive, they must still achieve substantial compliance with it by a pre-
scribed deadline.57
Although not codified in a single piece of legislation, like Dodd-
Frank, the EU's current initiatives can generally be classified into a
similar set of areas: systemic risk and financial stability, cross-border
crisis management, derivatives, executive compensation, credit-rating
agencies and securitization, alternative investment fund regulation,
and consumer protection. 58 A brief overview of key structural and or-
ganizational changes within the EU framework follows. This overview
provides context to the later discussion of the substantive provisions
within the identified areas of EU initiatives that have transnational
implications.
As an initial matter, the pan-European community has a new su-
pervisory framework, which comprises several new institutions, includ-
ing the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which has a similar
macro-prudential role as the United States' FSOC, and a European
System of Financial Supervisors, which consists of three sector-focused
55 See Alford, supra note 27, at 66-67 (citing COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, BRUS-
SELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL: PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS (Mar. 2009), available at http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st7/st07880.enO9.pdf).
56 See Tom Braithwaite & Peter Spiegel, US Defends Its Banking Reforms, FIN. TIMES
(London) (June 2, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/d91a5142-8cc3-1leO-beca-00144f
eab49a.hunl#axzz1bM3vvlR8.
57 See Directives-Definitions, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/eu-law/direc-
tives/directivesen.htm (last updated Aug. 17, 2011).
58 See Alert Memorandum from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Financial Reg-
ulatory Reform in the European Union: State of Play and Prospects 1-3 (July 26, 2011)
[hereinafter Financial Regulatory Reform in the European Union Memo], available at
http://www.cgsh.com/News/Search.aspx (search "financial regulatory reform"; follow title
hyperlink under "Alert Memoranda").
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European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). 59 These ESAs include the
European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA), the European
Banking Authority (EBA), and the European Insurance and Occupa-
tional Pensions Authority (EIOPA).6°
The ESA framework is a very positive development; indeed, the
United States should have aimed for a similar structural rearrange-
ment in Dodd-Frank. 6 1 The ESA institutions will be responsible for
micro-prudential supervision in their respective sectors, and they will
also be empowered to mediate between national-level officials, to li-
cense credit-rating agencies, and to advise the EC on new directives
and legislation. 62
In terms of substantive areas of regulation, both EU and key na-
tional agencies have indicated that they recognize the FSB's leading
role in coordinating financial reforms of international scope.6 3 This
suggests that where major EU jurisdictions-principally the UK
France, and Germany-have forged ahead with pilot programs in vari-
ous areas, there is diminished risk that those regimes will conflict with
each other or with final EC directives. Accordingly, the most impor-
tant elements of EU financial regulatory reform that will emanate be-
yond European borders-including cross-border resolutions,
derivatives reforms, and capital standards-will likely accord closely
with FSB standards, as will be discussed in the sections to follow.
Yet ultimately, the slower pace of the FSB and EC relative to the
United States, which has already established a statutory regime and
imposed firm deadlines and mandates for regulators to follow, creates
59 The new ESA, created in January 2011 pursuant to an expert panel's recommenda-
tions on regulatory reforms after the financial crisis, is empowered to coordinate and mon-
itor the supervision of European financial institutions with cross-border activity. Although
national and lower-level EU regulators maintain primary responsibility for day-to-day over-
sight, ESA officials have the power to compel certain actions when it determines that those
regulators are not performing adequately. See European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), FSA,
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/About/What/International/european/esas/index.shtml
(last updated Jan. 21, 2012).
60 See id.; see also Microprudential Supervision, BAFIN, http://www.bafin.de/nn_720492/
EN/BaFin/International/europeansupervision/microprudential/mikroprudentielleauf-
sicht _en _node.html? nnn=true (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (discussing the ESAs and
their powers and functions).
61 This could have been achieved by consolidating the SEC and CFTC into a securities
and market authority and by combining all of the federal banking regulators into a single
banking authority.
62 See KAREL LANNOO, CEPS POLICY BRIEF, No. 241, THE EU's RESPONSE TO THE FINAN-
IAL CRIsIs: A Mm-TERM REVIEw 2-3 (2011), available at http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/
download/5500.
63 See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FSA's INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 6, 9 (Oct. 2010),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/international/agenda.pdf; Michel Barnier, Mem-
ber of the European Comm'n, Speech Delivered at the Asian Financial Forum in Hong
Kong: Restoring Confidence in the Financial Sector-Acting Regionally and Globally (Jan.
16, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
SPEECH/1 2/6&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
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a clear risk of transatlantic divergence. Because most global financial
transactions still take place within the United States and the EU,6 4 it is
critical that these two jurisdictions adopt a unified front in the reform
process.
D. Other Jurisdictions
This Article focuses principally on the issue of divergence be-
tween the United States and the EU in financial regulatory reform,
given that cooperation between the two is absolutely essential to any
successful effort to build a strong, coordinated global framework.65
This focus, however, is not intended to downplay the importance of
key emerging jurisdictions participating in the reform process. To
that end, the United States and the EU must keep two critical impera-
tives in mind as they take a leadership role in shaping and implement-
ing G-20 and FSB standards.
First, in order for the FSB to emerge as the "fourth pillar" of the
global financial architecture as Secretary Geithner predicts, 66 it must
develop a firm foundation of legitimacy among all G-20 members.
U.S. and EU leaders, then, must take care to resolve differences on a
broader, multilateral basis where possible, as excessive reliance on bi-
lateral talks could weaken the FSB's authority and alienate other G-20
members. Such alienation and dimunition of authority would almost
surely fracture the global financial regulatory reform effort. Many G-
SIFIs have substantial operations in emerging markets, but as a pro-
portion of each G-SIFI's global footprint, the emerging market activity
may be relatively minimal as compared, for instance, to the G-SIFI's
U.S.- or EU-based business.67 Because of this comparative insignifi-
cance, regulators may not take sufficient account of emerging market
regulatory concerns in deciding on recovery or resolution measures
for G-SIFIs. 68 Without correctly taking these concerns into account,
officials in such markets may adopt restrictive measures to limit the
domestic consequences of a G-SIFI's failure, including ring-fencing of
assets and restrictions on cross-border distributions to affiliates.
64 See, e.g., ATLANTIC COUNCIL, THE DANGER OF DIVERGENCE: TRANSATLANTIC COOPERA-
TION ON FINANCIAL REFORM 2 (2010), available at http://www.acus.org/files/publication-
pdfs/403/ACUSTRDanger DivergenceReport.pdf.
65 Of the twenty-nine financial institutions currently designated as G-SIFIs by the FSB,
for instance, only four are based outside the United States or the EU: Bank of China,
Mitsubishi UFJ FG, Mizuho FG, and Sumitomo Mitsui FG. See infta note 71 and accompa-
nying text.
66 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
67 Cf IMF, RESOLUTION OF CROss-BoRDER BANKS, supra note 23, at 8 ("Certain
branches or subsidiaries may, in economic terms, be comparatively insignificant to a group
yet be of critical importance to their host country's financial system.").
68 See id. ("[Plarent banks [may] simply 'walk away' should the subsidiary encounter
difficulties, irrespective of the impact on the host country economy.").
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Second, the United States and the EU must maintain a firm, com-
mon approach in implementing G-20 recommendations, and they
must resist the temptation to weaken standards, which would likely
promote regulatory arbitrage. To be sure, it is possible that if U.S.
and EU policymakers enact tough, relatively uniform, new regulatory
standards, multinational financial institutions might pursue higher
leverage opportunities and fewer activity restrictions by migrating bus-
iness to enterprising jurisdictions outside the United States and the
EU that are less rigorous in financial regulation. But if major jurisdic-
tions can create a unified regulatory front that market actors perceive
as a "gold standard" for rules, supervision, and enforcement, institu-
tions that engage in regulatory arbitrage could face higher costs of
capital that would outweigh compliance savings. Indeed, a substantial
body of academic literature suggests that the U.S. securities regulation
regime accrues a valuation premium to international firms that opt
into it, due to investors' belief that those firms must meet the highest
standards for disclosure or face steep regulatory or litigation costs.
69
This phenomenon is known as "bonding. '70 Over the medium-term
horizon, much will turn on whether international financial reform ef-
forts exert enough bonding influence to forestall arbitrage within
noncooperative jurisdictions.
II
REGULATORY ISSUES WITH CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL
IMPLICATIONS
A. Supervision and Resolution
1. The Financial Stability Board Framework
After the November 2011 Cannes Summit, the FSB released a
document on policy measures to address "too-big-to-fail" risks posed
by G-SIFIs, and for the first time it named a group of twenty-nine G-
SIFIs that must meet certain resolution-related requirements by the
end of 2012.71 The policy measures cover four general areas: reform
69 See, e.g., Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Cost of Capital Effects and Changes in Growth
Expectations Around U.S. Cross-Listings, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 428, 428-29 (2009) (noting that
firms that cross list on U.S. exchanges decrease their cost of capital).
70 See id.; Craig Doidge et al., Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?, 4 J. FIN.
1507, 1508 (2010).
71 See Fin. Stability Bd., Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institu-
tions at 1, 4 (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_ 11104
bb.pdf. The currently designated G-SIFIs include: Bank of America, Bank of China, Bank
of New York Mellon, Banque Populaire CdE, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Com-
merzbank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bnak, Dexia, Goldman Sachs, Group Credit Agricole,
HSBC, ING Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Lloyds Banking Group, Mitsubishi UFJ FG, Mizuho
FG, Morgan Stanley, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, Societe Generale, State
Street, Sumitomo Mitsui FG, UBS, Unicredit Group, and Wells Fargo. Id. at 4.
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of national resolution regimes, requirements for recovery and resolu-
tion planning, more intensive supervision, and capital requirements. 72
This subpart deals with the first three of those areas, and subpart II.B
covers the matter of capital requirements.
At the Cannes Summit, the G-20 approved the FSB's document
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions,
which they intend to become the blueprint for recovery and resolu-
tion frameworks throughout keyjurisdictions. 73 Regarding regulatory
authority, the FSB observes that regulators must be able to preserve a
failing institution's systemically important functions-those that
would cause widespread harm if disrupted-and should minimize the
cost of resolution while making shareholders and creditors-not tax-
payers-bear any such costs.7 4 The FSB also recommends that regula-
tors have a "broad range of resolution powers," including the ability to
separate, operate, and sell systemically important functions (either
through a "good bank, bad bank" or "bridge" institution mechanism)
and to restructure or recapitalize institutions, potentially using statu-
tory "bail-in" measures. 75 More generally, the FSB stresses that regula-
tors must have sufficient authority over the institutions' contracts and
assets to be able to wind the firm down in an orderly fashion.7 6
The FSB, having stated in a prior release that there is "no imme-
diate prospect" of a treaty-based agreement to govern the resolution
of G-SIFIs, 77 recommends only that the "statutory mandate of a resolu-
tion authority should empower and strongly encourage the authority
72 See id. at 1. Recovery plans should set forth an institution's strategy to quickly re-
store capital and liquidity should it suffer significant, unexpected losses or experience a
run on deposits. They should outline management responses to both idiosyncratic (i.e.,
firm-specific) and systemic (i.e., market-wide) causes of adversity. Resolution plans, by
comparison, should provide a blueprint for rapid restructuring of the institution in a man-
ner which minimizes contagion effect, maintains systemically important operations, and
enables the orderly sale (in part or whole) of the institution. The core idea of recovery
and resolution planning is to craft "responses to a continuum of stresses" and to contin-
gent circumstances. See KPMG, THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION
PLANS ... STRESSED By THE BRAK Up? 5-6 (May 2011), available at http://www.kpmg.com/
global/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/Documents/recovery-resolution-
plansV2.pdf.
73 See FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR Fi-
NANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter FSB, KEY ATIRiBUTES], available at http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_l 11104cc.pdf.
74 See id. at 1, 3, 7-8.
75 See id. at 7-9. Statutory bail-in would allow the regulators to convert debt to equity
without the consent of the holder and to write-down equity. See CELA PAZARBASIOGLU ET
AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND, CONTINGENT CAPITAL: ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND DESIGN FEA-
TURES 18 box 3 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/
sdn1lOl.pdf
76 FSB, KEY ATrRIBUTES, supra note 73, at 17.
77 RBS Group PLC, fSB Consultative Document: Effective Resolution of Systemically Impor-
tant Financial Institutions-Recommendations and Timelines: Response 7 (Sept. 2, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/cl10909xx.pdf.
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wherever possible to act to achieve a cooperative solution with foreign
resolution authorities."7 8 Furthermore, the FSB believes that estab-
lishing national legal powers for cross-border cooperation (e.g., via
memoranda of understanding), crisis management groups within in-
stitutions,7 9 and institution-specific cross-border cooperation agree-
ments, while "falling short of a binding framework," is nonetheless a
"significant step. '80 The FSB further recommends that all G-SIFIs be
required to prepare both recovery and resolution plans, which regula-
tors should review annually.81
With respect to supervision, in November 2008 the G-20 called
for supervisors to "collaborate to establish supervisory colleges for all
major cross-border financial institutions, as part of efforts to
strengthen the surveillance of cross-border firms."82 The Basel Com-
mittee has set forth a document on "good practice principles" for su-
pervisory colleges, which focuses generally on informal, consultative
matters. 83 According to the Basel Committee, "[clolleges should not
be seen as a substitute for effective national supervision nor under-
mine the legal and prudential responsibilities of respective supervi-
sors. Colleges are not intended to be decision-making bodies but
should provide a framework to enhance effective supervision . "..."84
Furthermore, the Basel Committee intends its principles to "allow ad-
equate flexibility in the way that they are implemented by different
78 FSB, KEY ATrRIBUTES, supra note 73, at 13; see also FIN. STABILITY BD., CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT: EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
RECOMMENDATIONS AND TIMELINES 14-15, (July 2011) [hereinafter FSB, CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/rI 10719.
pdf ("[J]urisdictions should ensure that no legal, regulatory or policy impediments exist
that hinder the appropriate exchange of information, including firm-specific information,
between supervisory authorities, central banks, resolution authorities, finance ministries
and the public authorities responsible for insurance guarantee schemes.").
79 Crisis management groups have the objective of "enhancing preparedness for and
facilitating the management and resolution of a cross-border financial crisis." Cooperation
Agreement on Cross-Border Financial Stability, Crisis Management and Resolution Be-
tween Relevant Ministries, Central Banks and Financial Supervisory Authorities, Den.-Est.-
Fin.-Ice.-Lat.-Lith.-Nor.-Swed., 2(i), Aug. 17, 2010, available at http://www.fi.ee/failid/
Koostoolepingud/NB-MoU-public_170810.pdf. They are to include supervisory and reso-
lution authorities, central banks, finance ministries, and deposit guarantee officials from
jurisdictions that are material to the G-SIFI's resolution. See FSB, CONSULTATIVE Docu-
MENT, supra note 78, at 30.
80 Fin. Stability Bd., Effective Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions:
Overview of Responses to the Public Consultation 3 (Nov. 4, 2011) [hereinafter FSB, Overview of
Responses], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r111 104dd.
pdf.
81 FSB, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 78, at 17.
82 Press Release, G-20, Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World
Economy 4 (Nov. 15, 2008), available at http://www.financialstabilityboardoorg/press/pr_-
151108.pdf.
83 BASEL PRINCIPLES ON SUPERVISORY COLLEGES, supra note 22, at 1.
84 Id.
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jurisdictions."85 And in a crisis situation, the envisioned role of super-
visory colleges is to assist "in planning the crisis management meeting,
encouraging the banking group to produce appropriate information
for crisis management and serving as a conduit for information
sharing."8 6
2. The United States Framework
Dodd-Frank's supervisory reforms center on heightened pruden-
tial standards that the FRB is to promulgate and apply to designated
SIFIs.87 All bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of
at least $50 billion, as well as non-bank financial companies that the
FSOC designates as SIFIs, will be subject to those heightened stan-
dards, which are yet to be finalized.88 Other important supervisory
reforms include Dodd-Frank's annual stress testing requirement for
SIFIs, as well as SIFI capital surcharges, which will be discussed in Part
II.B, infra. Although other national regulators, such as the OCC, re-
tain key supervisory roles within large financial institutions, Dodd-
Frank clearly envisions the FRB as having the lead role in ensuring the
safety and soundness of SIFIs.89 Beyond its broad power to designate
SIFIs for FRB supervision, the FSOC's role is relatively informal and
advisory in nature.90
The centerpiece of Dodd-Frank, however, is the new Orderly Liq-
uidation Authority (OLA), over which the FDIC has primary responsi-
bility. Two key factors-a widespread consensus about the
unsuitability of bankruptcy for resolving complex financial institutions
and the unpopularity of using public money to bail out those firms-
shaped much of the U.S. debate and eventual legislation on resolu-
tion authority. As set forth in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress
created OLA with the express goal to facilitate the liquidation of "fail-
ing financial companies that pose a significant risk to the financial
stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates such risk and
minimizes moral hazard."91 Title II establishes that another purpose
of OLA is to ensure that taxpayer money will not be used for bailing
out failing financial institutions; instead, creditors and shareholders
must bear all losses.92 Under OLA, the FDIC is responsible for the
receivership and liquidation of financial companies, and it is statuto-
rily required to minimize loss, mitigate risk, and maximize the realiza-
85 Id.
86 Id. at 13.
87 Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 6-8.
88 Id. at 8.
89 Id. at 6-7.
90 Id. at 6.
91 Dodd-Frank Act § 204(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5384(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
92 See id.
[Vol. 97:10831102
THE LIMITS OF "NAME-AND-SHAME"
tion value of the failed company's assets while carrying out these
responsibilities. 93 Although OLA predates the FSB blueprint, the key
features of the two are substantially similar.94
OILA functions in the following way. First, specified federal regu-
lators95 make a recommendation to the Treasury Secretary that OLA
is necessary to resolve a particular institution.96 Among other factors,
the Treasury Secretary determines whether resolving the institution
under its default insolvency regime, typically bankruptcy, would have
profoundly adverse effects on the economy.97 If the Treasury Secre-
tary finds that it would have such effects, OLA liquidation can com-
mence with the approval of the company's board.98 However, the
Treasury Secretary can override a board's refusal by obtaining a court
order from the federal district court in the District of Columbia.99
Once the FDIC has taken the financial company into receivership
under OLA, it can exercise similar powers as it has under its organic
statute, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, to transfer assets and liabil-
ities of the firm to third parties or a bridge bank without shareholder
or creditor approval. 100 The FDIC can also repudiate burdensome
contracts or enforce contracts that another party could otherwise
terminate. 10'
There are also some important limitations on the exercise of
OLA power. First, the FDIC cannot put foreign subsidiaries of a finan-
cial institution into receivership because to do so would require coor-
93 See id. § 210(a) (9)(E), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a) (9) (E).
94 Jamieson L. Hardee, The Orderly Liquidation Authority: The Creditor's Perspective, 15
N.C. BANKING INST. 259, 261-67 (2011) (describing the OLA blueprint).
95 Depending on the type of financial institution, different regulatory agencies are
responsible for issuing this recommendation. For brokers or dealers (or financial compa-
nies in which a broker or dealer is the largest domestic subsidiary), the FRB and the SEC
make the recommendation, in consultation with the FDIC. For insurance companies (or
financial companies in which an insurance company is the largest domestic subsidiary), the
FRB and the Federal Insurance Office make the recommendation, again in consultation
with the FDIC. For all other systemically important financial institutions, the FRB and the
FDIC make the recommendation jointly. See The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Hold-
ings Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC Q., no. 2, 2011 at 31, 36, available at http://
www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/201 1 _vol5_2/Article2.pdf.
96 See Dodd-Frank Act § 203(a) (2), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(a) (2).
97 See id. § 203(b) (2), 12 U.S.C. § 5383(b) (2).
98 See The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank Act,
supra note 95, at 35-37.
99 See Dodd-Frank Act § 202(a) (1) (A), 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a) (1) (A). This order is likely
to be granted, since the Treasury Secretary's determination may only be struck down if it is
found "arbitrary and capricious," a threshold that is generally difficult to meet in judicial
review of administrative actions. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 283 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) ("This 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of review is a highly deferential one,
which presumes the agency's action to be valid." (citation omitted)).
100 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 210(a)(1)(G), 210(h) (1) (B), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5390(a)(1)(G),
5390(h) (1) (B).
101 Id. § 210(c), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c).
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dination with the relevant jurisdictions. 0 2 If OLA had existed at the
time of Lehman Brothers' demise, the firm's large UK subsidiary
would still have been subject to the UK insolvency laws. Accordingly,
OLA would have done little to obviate the lack of regulatory coopera-
tion between U.S. and UK authorities that has so hindered Lehman's
resolution.
Second, while the FDIC can borrow from the Treasury to facili-
tate a firm's liquidation, Dodd-Frank provides that if creditors and
shareholders cannot ultimately finance the insolvency themselves, reg-
ulators will impose an ex post levy on the remaining large financial
companies to make up the difference.103 In this respect OLA diverges
sharply from the FDIC's largely successful approach of financing reso-
lutions ex ante through the collection of deposit insurance premiums
from banks, based on the institutions' balance of deposits and degree
of risk posed to the fund. 10 4
While Congress set forth a relatively detailed statutory framework
for what OLA must and must not do, it also left some room for regula-
tors to make rules and clarify certain resolution-related matters. So
far, OLA rules have indicated that OLA does not apply to qualified
financial contracts, which ensures that the statutory safe harbor ap-
plies.10 5 This approach of honoring derivative contracts of troubled
financial companies should help minimize the risk of derivative-re-
lated contagion in the event of a major financial institution's insol-
vency, and as such, other jurisdictions should adopt similar provisions.
OLA rules, however, have also muddied the waters regarding set-off
rights because the rules indicate that the FDIC can transfer assets of a
failed firm free from any such rights. This contradicts Dodd-Frank,
which indicates that regulators should still respect contractual set-off
rights, but not common-law rights. 10 6
Likewise, Congress generally has left U.S. regulators with a sub-
stantial degree of flexibility in making rules on recovery and resolu-
tion planning, while imposing several notable restrictions that could
hinder the international alignment of such plans. Most importantly,
102 See id. § 210(a) (1) (E) (i), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a) (1) (E) (i) (granting power with re-
spect to a failing subsidiary of a financial company only if the financial company is organ-
ized under the U.S. federal or state law).
103 See id. § 210(o)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5390(o)(1).
104 See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2) (B) (describing the FDIC's assessments protocol).
105 Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 15. The safe harbor exempts
qualified financial contracts (QFC), which are generally derivative instruments, from sev-
eral key bankruptcy provisions. They are not subject to the automatic stay on claims, nor
the debtor's ability to assume or reject contracts (absent the creditor party's consent).
Collateral collected by QFC creditors on the eve of bankruptcy also cannot be attacked as a
preference. See Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special
Treatment, 12 U. PA.J. Bus. L. 61, 67 (2009).
106 Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 16-17.
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Dodd-Frank stipulates that financial companies must structure resolu-
tion plans with reference to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and they can-
not contemplate the use of OLA in their hypothetical resolution
planning.107 Considering that OLA was created precisely because the
Bankruptcy Code inadequately handled the resolution of complex fi-
nancial firms, this requirement may make it difficult for the largest
and most complex G-SIFIs to write resolution plans that would be
deemed "credible," which could allow regulators to exercise authority
under Dodd-Frank to compel the sale or subsidiarization of certain
business units.'08 Because Dodd-Frank also requires U.S. regulators to
subject foreign banking organizations with over $50 billion in global
consolidated assets to the U.S. resolution-planning process,10 9 there
are serious international implications arising from U.S. agencies'
eventual definition of a "credible" plan.
Finally, Dodd-Frank did nothing to remedy the problems that
U.S. ring-fencing laws and domestic depositor preference pose to the
effective resolution of internationally active firms, insofar as they allow
for discrimination against foreign creditors. 110 Ring-fencing laws pro-
vide for separate estates for non-U.S. banks' branches and agencies in
the event of bankruptcy.' If such an institution were to fail, ring-
fencing laws could allow a state to first satisfy the claims of state credi-
tors of the branch before returning the surplus funds, if any, to the
institution's home office. 112 Furthermore, certain state ring-fencing
laws even allow other states to satisfy claims before the remainder of
the funds is returned to the home office.113 Similarly, giving claims of
domestic depositors of failed FDIC-insured banks precedence over the
claims of foreign depositors and general creditors, as is currently the
U.S. approach, could hinder the exercise of OLA power by encourag-
107 See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d) (4), 12 U.S.C § 5365(d) (4); Dodd Frank: One Year
Later Memo, supra note 43, at 21.
108 See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(d) (5), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(d) (5); Dodd Frank: One Year
Later Memo, supra note 43, at 22-23.
109 SeeDodd-FrankAct§§ 165(a)(1), 165(d)(1), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5365(a)(1), 5365(d)(1);
Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 21.
110 See Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 24 ("U.S. ring fence laws
may impede the development of global resolution plans by tying up assets needed to satisfy
creditors of the home office.").
111 See id.
112 See id. at 24-25.
113 Given the substantial amount of assets that many international banks keep in New
York, the ring-fencing laws of New York State could significantly hinder the effective resolu-
tion of such institutions. Id. It is unclear whether the FRB, as the designated supervisor of
non-FDIC insured U.S. branches of foreign institutions, could preempt state ring-fencing
laws. To do so, the FRB would likely have to establish that the state law obstructs the
orderly resolution of international financial firms and therefore frustrates the purposes
and objectives of Congress (as expressed in OLA). But if this position were untenable,
Congress would have to preempt state ring-fencing laws through additional legislation.
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ing foreign counterparts to enact, maintain, and potentially use simi-
larly discriminatory measures. 114
In their public statements, U.S. government officials have ex-
pressed satisfaction with OLA powers as currently constituted, re-
marking that an international resolution mechanism would be both
unnecessary and politically unfeasible.1 15 But with Title II of Dodd-
Frank leaving so many key cross-border elements insufficiently ad-
dressed, it is difficult to be confident that OLA will facilitate the effec-
tive resolution of any U.S.-based systemically important financial
institution, given that nearly all such institutions have substantial in-
ternational operations.
3. The European Union Framework
The EC is currently in the process of formulating a cross-border
supervisory and crisis management framework. The EC has indicated
that it intends to proceed "gradually" toward a comprehensive EU re-
gime for troubled and failing banks and has set forth a multiyear
blueprint for doing so.'1 6 Its first step "will include a common set of
resolution tools and reinforcement of cooperation between national
authorities in order to improve the effectiveness of the arrangements
for dealing with the failure of cross border banks."'1 7 In its second
step, the EC will study the need for harmonization of member states'
bank insolvency regimes-with an eye to ensuring no conflicts be-
tween substantive and procedural rules-and will legislate as neces-
114 In 1993, Congress provided that claims of domestic depositors of failed FDIC-in-
sured banks should take precedence over claims of foreign depositors and general credi-
tors. This is known as national depositor preference. James A. Marino & Rosalind L.
Bennett, The Consequences of National Depositor Preference, FDIC BANKING REv., Oct. 1999, at
19, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/1999oct/2_v12n2.pdf.
Such a policy of depositor nondiscrimination is absolutely required before any treaty-based
framework on resolution can emerge. See Candice A. Wyllie, A Comparative Analysis of Non-
discrimination in Multilateral Agreements; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT), and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT), 18 WILLAMETIT J.
INT'L L. & Disp. RESOL. 64, 65-67 (2010) (discussing the importance of nondiscrimination
clauses in international treaties).
115 See, e.g., Does the Dodd-Frank Act End "Too Big to Fail?". Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. app. at 74-78
(2011) (prepared statement of Michael H. Krimminger, General Counsel, FDIC), available
at http://www.financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/112-37.pdf (stating that "the
regulatory authorities who will administer the OLA are in a far better position to coordi-
nate with foreign regulators [as compared to pre-Dodd-Frank powers] in the failure of an
institution with significant international operations" and that "[i]t does not appear that
creating [an international resolution] framework is a realistic near-term goal").
116 Internal Market and Servs. Directorate Gen., European Comm., Working Docu-
ment: Technical Details of a Possible EU Framework for Bank Recovery and Resolution
1-2 (Jan. 6, 2011) [hereinafter DG Internal Market and Servs., Possible EU Framework],
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/consultations/docs/2011/crisis-man
agement/consultation-paperen.pdf.
117 Id. at 7.
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sary on this issue by the end of 2012.118 Finally, if the EU has
successfully "put in place a single set of substantive rules with respect
to resolution and insolvency," the EC's third step will be to create a
single European Resolution Authority (ERA), possibly by 2014.119
With respect to resolution financing, the EC, like their U.S. coun-
terparts, expects G-SIFI shareholders and creditors to bear the initial
burden.1 20 In preparing for situations where those resources might
be insufficient, the EC is still working through options: it has
launched consultations on bank taxes for financial transactions and
activities and on a separate ex post bank levy (similar to the United
States) as possible funding mechanisms for EU resolutions. 121 EC
leaders are also considering mechanisms to help finance recoveries of
G-SIFIs, most notably contingent capital instruments that would facili-
tate statutory or contractual "bail-ins," while emphasizing that such
measures should only be a "last resort" so as to "underpin market
discipline."1 22
As currently envisioned, the EU's cross-border management legis-
lation will apply to all credit institutions, certain investment firms, and
their holding companies (covered institutions). 123 It will allow mem-
ber states' prudential supervisors to retain the power to exercise early
intervention, and member states will also be able to choose which au-
thority is responsible for resolution, provided that resolution and su-
pervisory authorities are functionally distinct.1 24 Although the EC
proposed that early intervention powers be tied to the requirements
of the EU's Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), such that a CRD
deficiency would trigger intervention, commenters to the EC's propo-
sal argued that this standard would be too indeterminate. 125
Whatever the final EC legislation sets as a trigger, the early interven-
tion powers are likely to include the ability to: (1) compel capital
raises or the allocation of net profits to rebuild capital; (2) prohibit
distributions to shareholders; (3) restrict or limit certain business ac-
tivities; (4) impose additional reporting requirements; and (5) order
replacement of board members or executives. 126
The EU will also require all covered institutions to draw up recov-
ery plans that outline the measures they would take in the event of
systemic or idiosyncratic adversity, such as raising capital or liquidity
118 See id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 9.
121 See id. at 7.
122 See id. at 9, 86-87.
123 Financial Regulatory Reform in the European Union Memo, supra note 58, at 9.
124 See id.
125 See id. at 10.
126 See id.
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problems. 127 In addition to recovery plans, the EU will require institu-
tions to have resolution plans. But in an important contrast to the
U.S. process, EU regulators will be in charge of drafting these plans,
with input from the covered institution. 128 Although the exact way
the resolution plan requirement will apply to various units of the cov-
ered institution is currently uncertain, it appears likely that EU offi-
cials will impose the requirement at both the holding-company and
business-unit levels. 129 Thus, if a covered institution fails to submit a
credible recovery plan or refuses to implement additional measures
required by regulators after their review of the plan, those regulators
could install a "special manager" for a one-year term with the mandate
to either restore the institution's stability or to wind it down. 130
The EC's potential creation of an ERA echoes an approach set
forth in a 2010 IMF working paper that the then-managing director
and European operations director for the IMF endorsed.1 3 ' If cre-
ated, the ERA will be an important complement to the existing ESAs.
The EC has already discussed the possibility of giving the European
Banking Authority (EBA), one of the ESAs, substantial powers in the
supervisory aspects of this framework, specifically the power to de-
velop and coordinate recovery and resolution planning and even pos-
sibly to resolve national disputes over how to apply preparatory and
preventative measures.1 32 The ESAs currently have representation in
the supervisory colleges of regulators for each major cross-border in-
stitution, and they will likely have the power to require those colleges
to take certain actions relating to preventive and recovery
measures. 
33
Although most of these powers are clear and uncontroversial, the
EBA's potential power to order national resolution authorities,
through its participation in supervisory colleges, to cooperate or take
certain actions in event of a financial institution's insolvency is less
clear.13 4 As the EC suggests in its consultation paper on the EBA's
role regarding resolutions, mixing supervisory and resolution authori-
ties does not seem entirely appropriate, given the risk of forbearance
that could arise. 13 5 Yet this potential conflict of interest need not pre-
vent a well-structured regulatory body from exercising both functions
127 Id. at 9.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 10.
131 See Wim Fonteyne et al., Crisis Management and Resolution for a European Banking
System 57-60 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/70, 2010), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wpo7o.pdf.
132 DG Internal Market and Servs., Possible EU Framework, supra note 116, at 14-15.
133 See LANNOO, supra note 62, at 2-3.
134 See DG Internal Market and Servs., Possible EU Framework, supra note 116, at 15.
135 See id. at 14.
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effectively, as the FDIC's long and largely successful track record of
bank supervision and resolution indicates. 13 6 Until the ERA material-
izes, it is important to have some EU-level authority such as the EBA
that will be able to coordinate potentially divergent national resolu-
tion approaches in the midst of a crisis. 137
4. Key Tensions
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the United States and the
EU could potentially diverge on supervisory and resolution authority
in a number of ways, and this divergence could hinder the future han-
dling of a complex financial institution's insolvency. To eliminate this
concern, the two jurisdictions need closer cooperation. Such cooper-
ation may be difficult to achieve, however.
The first issue is timing. The United States has already codified
its authority in this area with Title II of Dodd-Frank, 38 and Congress
is unlikely to devote substantial attention to revising OLA in the short
to medium term. As such, the EU will have to model much of its
framework on OLA in order to ensure harmony because the ability of
U.S. officials to "converge" toward the EU will be limited to U.S. agen-
cies' rulemaking authority under Dodd-Frank-and such rulemaking
must arise from a reasonable interpretation of the statute to withstand
judicial scrutiny.139 Fortunately, the FSB's consultative document on
136 See The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank Act,
supra note 95, at 34-35 (discussing the FDIC's role as receiver to failed banks).
137 To their credit, key EU jurisdictions have been working to setup new orderly reso-
lution mechanisms in the meanwhile. In its Banking Act of 2009, the UK established a
Special Resolution Regime (SSR) that allows the UK authorities five options in resolving
banks, which is a power that is broadly similar to the FDIC's under OILA. See Special Resolu-
tion Regime, BANK OF ENG., http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/role/
risk.reduction/srr/index.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (stating that the SSR powers in-
clude the authority to (1) "transfer all or part of a bank to a private sector purchaser;"
(2) "transfer all or part of a bank to a bridge bank.., pending a future sale;" (3) "place a
bank into temporary public ownership;" (4) "apply to put a bank into the Bank Insolvency
Procedure;" and (5) "apply for the use of the Bank Administration Procedure to deal with
a part of a bank that is not transferred and is instead put into administration"). Germany
has also passed legislation setting forth its own framework for the resolution authority of a
.systemically important bank." MONTHLY REPORT: FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF THE GERMAN
BANK RESTRUCTURING ACT, DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 59-60, 69 (June 2011), available at
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/volkswirtschaft/mba/2011/201106mba-enbank_
restructuring-act.pdf. The German Bundesbank, while describing its new framework in
terms substantially similar to the FSB's, frankly acknowledges that "[a] purely German ap-
proach to solving this problem is likely to be insufficient in the case of internationally
active credit institutions" and frequently makes deferential note of the EC's progress to-
ward an EU-wide approach to resolution authority. Id. at 75.
138 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 201-217, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442-1520
(2010).
139 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840-45
(1984) (holding that if a "statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,"
the reviewing court must defer to the agency's interpretation if it is a reasonable interpre-
tation of the statute).
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resolution authority tracks OLA closely, so the EU's eventual legisla-
tion should not diverge substantially from the United States' if EU
officials continue to orient their efforts to the FSB.140 However, to the
extent that the EU goes beyond what the FSB has proposed in its
"third step"-the creation of an ERA-material differences between
OLA and the ERA might emerge.1 41
The way in which the United States and the EU will execute the
FSB's call for "firm-specific" agreements on resolutions is also un-
clear. 142 The proposed arrangement within the EU is for the EBA (as
an ESA) to have representation within the supervisory colleges and
power to order national regulators to cooperate or take certain ac-
tions. 143 But where financial institutions have substantial operations
outside the EU, necessitating the engagement of non-EU supervisors,
this deepening of intra-European authority-without similar integra-
tion among other relevantjurisdictions-could create a multilayer sys-
tem of supervisory cooperation that may prove confusing and
ineffective. In the short run, memoranda of understanding could
help alleviate this matter, but beyond that, as this Article will argue, a
treaty-based framework under the FSB's aegis will be essential to
streamlining and formalizing these supervisory mechanisms.
Moreover, the United States' and the EU's approaches to recov-
ery and resolution planning also pose a number of potential tensions.
Under its broad definition of "covered institutions," the EU will sub-
ject thousands of banks and other financial firms to the recovery and
resolution-planning requirement, whereas the United States only re-
quires the largest banks to do so.14 4 The fact that the EU provides for
regulators to write the plans, albeit with institutional input, as com-
pared to the United States' requirement that the firms themselves
write the plans is another area ripe for inconsistency.' 45 And the im-
practical Dodd-Frank provision that U.S. resolution plans cannot refer
140 Compare Dodd-Frank Act §§ 201-217, 124 Stat. at 1422-1520, with FSB, CONSULTA-
TVE DOCUMENT, supra note 78.
141 See DG Internal Market and Servs., Possible EU Framework, supra note 116, at 7.
142 See FSB, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 78, at 15 ("Firm-specific agreements
are needed among all members of a firm's Crisis Management Group (CMG), which
should include the home and all key host jurisdictions.").
143 See supra text accompanying notes 132-33.
144 See Edward F. Greene & Seth Grosshandler, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP,
High-Level Comparison of Dodd-Frank and Emerging EU Regulations 4-5 (July 26, 2011)
(unpublished PowerPoint outline) (on file with authors) (comparing the power of U.S.
regulatory authorities under the Dodd-Frank Act with European resolution authorities);
Gabriele Steinhauser, EU Proposes Tougher Bank Rules, ABC NEWS (July 20, 2011), http://
abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=14115296 ("The EU will force all 8,200 banks and
investment funds based in the bloc to stick to the new capital requirements. By contrast,
the U.S., which has promised to implement the Basel III rules, will only make the 20 big-
gest lenders apply the rules . . ").
145 Steinhauser, supra note 144.
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to OLA may well conflict with EU requirements, to the extent that
European regulators allow their institutions to contemplate the use of
their orderly liquidation regimes in resolution planning.146
Recovery and resolution financing could be a critical transatlantic
flash point as well. Dodd-Frank eschews any use of ex ante (i.e., before
resolution) financing, such as bail-in instruments. 147 European lead-
ers, by contrast, appear more open to such mechanisms to finance
recoveries as a "last resort"14 8 -a more versatile and pragmatic ap-
proach. Dodd-Frank's inflexibility on this point may not only strait
jacket U.S. regulators in the event of another financial meltdown but
may also limit the ability of foreign counterparts to coordinate with
the United States in executing recovery measures for a G-SIFI. By
comparison, there is less likelihood for divergence between the
United States and the EU in resolution financing, given the baseline
expectation in both jurisdictions that G-SIFI creditors and sharehold-
ers should bear that burden entirely. But in situations where addi-
tional financing is necessary, it could make a difference whether the
EU aligns with the United States in imposing an ex post tax on the
banking industry or instead opts for a separate policy.
B. Capital and Liquidity Standards
1. The Basel Committee and Financial Stability Board Frameworks
At its Seoul Summit in November 2010, the G-20 endorsed the
Basel Committee's proposed Basel III capital and liquidity framework,
with leaders pledging to begin implementation byJanuary 1, 2013 and
to finish no later than January 1, 2019.149 The key difference between
Basel III and its Basel II is its vastly greater emphasis on equity capital,
which is a positive development. Under Basel III, banks must increase
their common equity capital ratio (as a percentage of risk-weighted
assets) to 4.5% by 2015-more than double the current requirement
of 2%.150 By 2019, banks must also implement a new "capital conser-
vation buffer" of 2.5%, meaning that the common equity requirement
will effectively be 7% once Basel III is fully in place. 151 Basel III also
raises the Tier 1 and total capital ratios to 8.5% and 10.5%, respec-
146 Compare supra text accompanying note 107, with supra text accompanying note 132.
147 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
148 See DG Internal Market and Servs., Possible EU Framework, supra note 116, at 9.
149 G-20, The G-20 Seoul Summit Leaders'Declaration 29 (Nov. 11-12, 2010), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/G20COMMUN I10.pdf.
150 Press Release, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int'l Settlements,
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announces Higher Global Minimum Capi-
tal Standards 1-2 (Sept. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Basel III Announcement], available at
http://www.bis.org/press/p100912.pdf.
151 Id.
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tively, including a conservation buffer, and it narrows the definition of
Tier 1 capital.' 52
At the urging of U.S. officials, Basel III also now tentatively in-
cludes a so-called "leverage ratio." 153 This ratio reflects the measure
of Tier 1 capital over total assets, and the accord provisionally sets it at
3%.154 Because the denominator in the three risk-weighted measures
depends heavily on banks' internal risk methodologies, the relatively
simpler leverage ratio, in which assets are not risk-weighted, will serve
as an important backstop in case the risk of certain assets are systemat-
ically underestimated, as mortgage-backed securities were in the last
crisis. The Basel Committee will assess the level of the leverage ratio
for appropriateness between 2013 and 2017, and the level will not be-
come final until 2018.155 The intention of the Basel Committee is that
the above ratios should be mandatory for all G-20 banks, but as the
Basel Accords are not treaties but instead nonbinding agreements be-
tween central banks and supervisory authorities, member countries
must uniformly implement them to achieve the desired legal effect. 156
The Accords also provide for a discretionary countercyclical capi-
tal buffer, ranging from 0% to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets, which na-
tional regulators can choose to impose during positive economic
conditions. 157 Just as deleveraging is a long, painful process due to
the feedback loop between falling asset prices and capital cushions, 158
152 The Tier 1 ratio will increase from 4% of risk-weighted assets to 6% (and thus 8.5%
when added to the capital conservation buffer). The total capital ratio will be raised to 8%
(and thus 10.5% when added to the capital conservation buffer). See id. at Annex 1. Tier
1, which previously consisted of mortgage servicing rights, minority investments in qualify-
ing financial institutions, certain deferred tax assets, and trust preferred securities to count
fully alongside common equity, will-over a 10 year transition period-eventually exclude
trust preferred securities entirely and only allow the other noncommon equity factors to be
recognized as Tier 1 up to 15% of common equity. The total capital ratio allows Tier 1
plus certain reserves and hybrid instruments. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 263
(describing pre-Basel III capital definitions); Memorandum from Mayer Brown, Legal Up-
date: Basel III Capital Ratios and Transition Periods Set, but Key Questions Remain 3
(Sept. 17, 2010), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=96
59&nid=6 (describing changes to capital ratios as a result of Basel III).
153 See Financial Regulatory Reform Hearing, supra note 41, app. at 74 (statement of Sheila
C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
154 Basel III Announcement, supra note 150, at 2.
155 Id.
156 Id.; see also WALTER W. EuBANK.S, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41467, THE STATUS OF
THE BASEL III CAPITAL ADEQUACY ACCORD 1 (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/
rpts/R41467_20101028.pdf ("The [Basel] accords are not treaties. Member countries may
modify the agreement to suit[ ] their financial regulatory structures.").
157 Basel III Announcement, supra note 150, at 2 ("The Basel Committee and the FSB
are developing a well integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions
which could include combinations of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in
debt.... Governors and Heads of Supervision endorse the aim to strengthen the loss
absorbency of non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments.").
158 Falling asset prices deplete a financial institution's capital cushion, which requires
the financial institution to shed assets to eliminate liabilities in order to restore the various
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leveraging can naturally and dangerously accelerate during times of
rising asset prices. The countercyclical capital requirement is a wise
implementation that aims to dampen this whipsaw effect between pe-
riods of leveraging and deleveraging.
Also at the Seoul Summit, the G-20 approved the FSB's proposal
to subject G-SIFIs to an additional capital requirement.1 59 This con-
troversial proposal contemplates the use of instruments such as con-
vertible capital or bail-ins, in addition to common equity, to meet the
G-SIFI requirement.160 In June 2011, however, the Basel Committee
agreed that the way to meet the requirement was with a "progressive
common equity tier 1 capital requirement ranging from 1 percent to
2.5 percent, depending on a bank's systemic importance." 61 To pre-
vent moral hazard among banks at the 2.5% level, the G-20 has also
recently approved a Basel proposal that would allow them to impose
an additional 1% on such banks if those banks become more systemi-
cally important.162 The G-20 will implement this measure between
January 1, 2016 and the end of 2018.163
To sum up the capital picture, G-20 banks will eventually be sub-
ject to ratios of 7%, 8.5%, and 10.5% for risk-weighted common eq-
uity, Tier 1 capital, and total capital as a baseline matter, 164 and
potentially up to 9.5%, 12%, and 13% for these same categories in
boom times should national regulators impose countercyclical buffers
in full. 165 The banks will also face a separate, non-risk-weighted lever-
age ratio, which, if not finalized at 3% in 2018, should not be mark-
edly different. 166 Since the G-20 has approved the Basel G-SIFI
proposal, G-SIFIs face even higher common equity ratios, including a
minimum of 8% to 9.5% depending on the size and systemic impor-
tance of the institution and potentially higher still if regulators impose
the countercyclical or the "moral-hazard" SIFI surcharges. 167
ratios. When a number of institutions are selling off assets in this fashion, downward price
pressure on those assets persists, thus perpetuating the feedback loop.
159 Basel III Announcement, supra note 150, at 2; see also G-20, The G20 Seoul Summit
Leaders' Declaration, supra note 149, at 2 (announcing "measures to better regulate and
effectively resolve systemically important financial institutions").
160 Basel III Announcement, supra note 150, at 2.
161 Huw Jones, Central Bankers Agree on Bank Capital Surcharge Plan, REuTERs (June 25,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/25/us-basel-banks-idUSTRE7500Z1201
10625. Basel's Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision reached this agreement; this
group is comprised of representatives from member countries and is Basel's highest deci-
sion-making body. Id.
162 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SEITLEMENTS, GLOBAL Sys-
TEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKs: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE ADDITIONAL Loss ABSOR-
BENCY REQUIREMENT 16-16 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf.
163 Jones, supra note 161.
164 See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 154-73 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps just as important as its capital enhancements, Basel III
also addresses liquidity risk for the first time. It will do so through two
ratios: a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and a net stable funding ratio
(NSFR). 168 The LCR, which will be implemented by 2015,169 requires
banks to hold enough liquid assets to be able to survive a short-term,
thirty-day, liquidity crunch.170 As currently designed, government
bonds form the bulk of the LCR rule171-a structure that could come
into question in light of sovereign troubles in Europe. The NSFR,
which will come into effect in 2018,172 focuses on banks' ability to
withstand longer-term market stress. In particular, the NSFR aims to
establish a minimum amount of stable funds that banks must use to
finance various kinds of lending.1 73 Stable funds are those that a bank
can expect to maintain for at least a year of adverse systemic
conditions.174
2. The United States Framework
As the G-20 continues to endorse Basel III and FSB proposals on
capital, the United States will undertake to implement those propos-
als. So far, however, U.S. regulators have indicated that they will only
subject the twenty largest U.S. banks to Basel III, marking a sharp di-
vergence from their EU counterparts, who will apply it to all banks
and certain investment firms for a total of over 8000 institutions. 175
Unlike resolution authority, where Dodd-Frank sets forth a com-
prehensive statutory mandate that U.S. agencies usea76-irrespective
of how it may diverge from subsequent developments abroad-capital
and liquidity standards give regulators more rulemaking flexibility.
The most contentious capital-related issue in the United States relates
to the implementation of the SIFI surcharge, in regards to which FRB
Governor Daniel Tarullo set off a firestorm of bank protests in early
168 MARC SAIDENBERG, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., BASEL Ill-THE LIQUmTY RULES AND REGU-
LATIONS 3 (2011), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital-assets/others/events/
2011/bsc/saidenberg_1020am_0506.pdf.
169 Id.
170 Id. at5.
171 See, e.g., Zentraler Kreditausschuss, Position Paper on the Consultative Document of the
Basel Committee: "International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitor-
ing" 10 (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/zkral.pdf (defining
the characteristics of "high quality liquid assets" as used in the LCR's numerator).
172 SAIDENBERG, supra note 168, at 3.
173 Id. at 6.
174 Id.
175 Steinhauser, supra note 144.
176 See, e.g., Memorandum from Cadwaader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, Orderly Liqui-
dation of Financial Companies, Including Executive Compensation Clawback, Under the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 1 (July 20, 2010), available at
http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client-friend/072010_DF2.pdf (describing the OLA
provision).
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June when he opined that "[t]he enhanced capital requirement im-
plied by this methodology can range between about 20% to more
than 100% over the Basel III requirements," which would entail a po-
tential maximum common equity ratio up to 14%.177 But the FRB's
proposed rule of December 2011 requires designated SIFIs to main-
tain a Tier 1 common risk-based capital ratio greater than 5% under
both normal and stressed conditions; beyond that, the FRB intends to
make a later proposal to separately set risk-based capital surcharges
based on Basel 111.178 Although this rule has yet to be finalized at the
time of this writing, the fact that the FRB does not intend to depart
materially from Basel III is encouraging from the standpoint of cross-
border alignment.
Several other new U.S. requirements in the capital and liquidity
area also have potential international implications. One is the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System's (the Fed) proposed rule
to require U.S. bank-holding companies (BHCs) with $50 billion in
assets, as well as U.S.-domiciled BHC subsidiaries of foreign banks that
also meet that criterion, to submit annual capital plans to the Fed for
review and approval. 179 These plans must address how the institution
would continue operations and keep adequate capital levels during
adverse economic conditions.180 The parameters set forth in the
plans will carry formidable legal consequences, including restrictions
on capital distributions, dividend payments, and stock repurchases. 18
Another important requirement is the stress-testing framework
that the Fed and OCC will impose on BHCs with more than $10 bil-
lion in assets. 182 According to those agencies' guidance document,
they envision stress-testing as a "forward-looking" and flexible en-
deavor.183 In its proposed rule, the Fed intends to conduct annual
stress tests under "baseline, adverse, and severely adverse scenarios"
and disclose the results publicly.18 4 In practice, agencies will likely
draw on the successful experience of stress-testing U.S. banks in 2009,
which provided much-needed market transparency to the banking
177 Craig Torres & Ben Moshinsky, Fed Is Said to Back Three-Percentage-Point Capital
Surcharge for Big Banks, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-06-07/fed-is-said-to-back-3-percentage-point-capital-surcharge-for-largest-banks.htm
(quoting Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo).
178 Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Covered
Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 594, 602 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
252) [hereinafter Enhanced Prudential Standards Proposed Rule].
179 Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 9.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 See id. (outlining the stress-testing framework).
183 Enhanced Prudential Standards Proposed Rule, supra note 178, at 608 ("[A] cov-
ered company's liquidity stress scenarios must be forward-looking and incorporate a range
of potential changes to a covered company's exposures . ).
184 Id. at 601.
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sector and allowed banks to raise substantial private capital for the
first time since the crisis. 18 5 As U.S. agencies continue to hone their
procedures in this area, they should consult with the EU and other
foreign counterparts to try to harmonize stress-testing processes to the
fullest extent possible.
3. The European Union Framework
In the EU, the fourth iteration of the Capital Requirements Di-
rective (CRD IV) will implement Basel III.186 The EC proposed the
draft CRD IV in July 2011, and it must still gain approval of EU mem-
ber states and European Parliament.18 7 While the vast majority of
CRD IV draws directly from the Basel Committee's framework, there
are some noteworthy, albeit relatively minor, differences and elabora-
tions. First, in imposing CRD IV on EU investment firms, the EC went
beyond Basel III's focus on "internationally active banks." The EU has
justified this departure by arguing that including investment firms is
necessary to forestall regulatory arbitrage and to avoid creating an un-
fair competitive landscape for banks.1 88
Another difference between the frameworks is that prior CRD it-
erations took the form of directives, which required transposition into
national law, while CRD IV consists of both regulations and direc-
tives.189 In contrast to directives, regulations set forth prescriptive
rules (which are effective when the regulation is adopted) that EU
member states must follow.190 The CRD IV regulations cover capital,
185 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1O-861, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PRO-
GRAM: BANK STRESS TEST OFFERS LESSONS AS REGULATORS TAKE FURTHER ACTIONS TO
STRENGTHEN SUPERVISORY OVERSIGHT 19 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
320/310225.pdf (finding that the U.S. stress tests helped strengthen market confidence in
the banking system).
186 Martina Garcia, Deputy Dir., Banking & Fin. Sector Analysis, HM Treasury, Imple-
menting Basel III for a Healthier EU Banking Sector 3 (Apr. 8, 2011) (unpublished
PowerPoint presentation), available at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/news/
BaselGarcia.pdf. The original CRD was promulgated in 2006, before the financial crisis,
Basel II and the Capital Requirements Directives, EURACTV.COM (July 7, 2009), http://www.
euractiv.com/financial-services/basel-ii-capital-requirements-directives/article-141423?dis-
play=normal, and has been followed by a CRD II and CRD III. The CRD II contained
reforms relating to securitizations, large exposures, and capital definitions, requiring im-
plementation between October 2008 and December 2010. The CRD III covered trading
books, bonds, and compensation issues, and required implementation between July 2009
and July 2011. Garcia, supra, at 3.
187 Brooke Masters & Nikki Tait, Brussels Unveils Tough Bank Capital Rules, FIN. TIMES
(London) (July 20, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8a45955a-b2a6-1 le0-bc28-00
144feabdc0.html#axzzl Uf07Mna2.
188 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Flash News: CRD IV-Announcement of 20July 2011: A Re-
vised Basel I? 1 (Aug. 1, 2011) [hereinafter PWC, CRD IV], http://www.pwc.com/lu/en/
risk-management/docs/pwc-risk-management-081 1.pdf.
189 Id. at 2.
190 Id.
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liquidity, leverage, and counterparty credit risk issues,1 9 ' virtually en-
suring that EU member states will not diverge in these areas. The
prior directives covered a number of other areas that the EC deemed
to have an integral relation to national administrative law-and were
thus better suited to the transposition process-including prudential
supervision, corporate governance, and sanctions.1 92
With respect to liquidity-risk management, the CRD IV maintains
substantial fidelity to the Basel III framework, with several minor ex-
ceptions. Following Commissioner Michel Barnier's repeated skepti-
cism of rating agencies in determining the liquidity risk of assets, the
CRD IV assigns the EBA the role of formulating criteria for how to
judge assets under the LCR of Basel 111.193 The EC also reserves the
right to amend the LCR requirement through the implementation
process should unexpected effects occur.' 94 As to the NSFR, the EC
did not lay out any specific details, noting that it will avail itself of
Basel III's lengthy observation period that lasts until 2018 to write a
proposal. 195 The EBA will need to consult with peer authorities in
other jurisdictions to ensure that these classifications do not diverge
internationally.
4. Key Tensions
At present, both U.S. and EU officials seem to agree on the key
aspects of Basel III, and they are making progress toward those key
aspects' implementation.1 96 Accordingly, the risk of divergence ap-
pears relatively lower in capital and liquidity than in other key areas of
regulation. Nevertheless, it will be critical for policymakers to main-
tain momentum over Basel III's lengthy implementation periods, es-
pecially as financial institutions apply substantial pressure on
regulators to not impose overly burdensome requirements.
The most obvious area of potential divergence between the
United States and the EU concerns the number of institutions that
Basel III will cover. The United States proposes to apply it only to the
twenty largest institutions active in its jurisdiction, whereas the EU will
subject substantially all European-active banks to Basel III require-
ments.1 9 7 Commissioner Barnier has repeatedly emphasized that the
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 7-8.
194 Id. at 6.
195 Id.
196 See, e.g., EU, US and Japanese Banks Face Basel Checks on Capital Starting in First Quarter,
AUSTRALIAN (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/world/eu-us-and-
japanese-banks-face-basel-checks-on-capital-starting-in-first-quarter/story-e6frg9Oo-122623
9877298.
197 Steinhauser, supra note 144.
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United States' position will invariably lead to regulatory arbitrage, ar-
guing at one point that "you cannot apply rules to 8,200 banks as you
would to 20 banks."198 Both sides have valid claims: on the one hand,
subjecting very small banks to Basel III as the EU does may well im-
pose a needless compliance burden on those banks, but on the other
hand, differentiating among institutions as the United States does may
cause potential uniformity and fairness problems. But beyond the
merits and drawbacks of either position, the most concerning element
is the mere fact of disparity between the United States and the EU and
the uneven capital regulation landscape that will consequently
emerge. As such, it is critical that these jurisdictions reach some form
of compromise.
The implications for competition resulting from higher capital
standards will be another probable point of cross-border tension.
Truly onerous capital standards would likely hinder growth at pre-
cisely the moment when most economies need a jumpstart. But as
U.S. Treasury Under Secretary Lael Brainard has pointed out, the av-
erage Tier 1 ratio among the fifty largest global banks is already 11.3,
which is squarely in the range of the Basel III requirement and the
proposed SIFI surcharge. 199 Accordingly, meeting those require-
ments would not entail any additional deleveraging; it would only pre-
vent those institutions from releveraging.
Furthermore, European regulators bought into the Basel II
framework-which relied heavily on banks' own internal modeling to
calculate regulatory capital-more thoroughly than did U.S. regula-
tors (with the exception of the SEC).200 Accordingly, it may be some-
what more difficult for the U.S. to move toward the markedly different
Basel III regime-most notably, the leverage ratio and higher com-
mon equity requirements. 20 1 As former FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair
pointed out:
European banks continue to effectively set their own capital re-
quirements using internal risk-estimates, unconstrained by any ob-
jective hard limits.... [R] epresentatives of some major European
governments go out of their way to express public misgivings about
following through to implement the internationally agreed leverage
198 Huw Jones, EU Banks Face Fines If They Fall Short on Capital, RE UTERS (July 20, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/20/eu-banks-idUSL6E7IKOKD20110720.
199 Financial Regulatory Reform Hearing, supra note 41, app. at 92 (statement of Lael
Brainard, Under Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury).
200 ATrAric CouNcIL, supra note 64, at 19.
201 The EU is clearly taking a more measured pace in implementing the leverage (i.e.
non-risk-weighted) ratio that their American counterparts consider so critical. While
agreeing to implement the ratio, the EC will initially make it a nonbinding "Pillar 2" mea-
sure under the CRD. Beginning in 2013, EU regulators will begin to assess banks' leverage
ratios, and if no unexpected side effects emerge, the liquidity ratio will become part of the
binding "Pillar 1" by 2018. PWC, CRD IV, supra note 188, at 5.
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ratio.... [T] he prospects for further banking problems are unset-
tlingly high. 20 2
For their part, major U.S. banks have strenuously argued that the
United States should not necessarily commit to a common SIFI
surcharge with foreign counterparts. They often note the difficulty of
ensuring that other jurisdictions are enforcing the capital standards
uniformly, and they point out that the U.S. regulators may have legiti-
mate, one-off reasons for exempting institutions from the
surcharge. 20 3 One such reason may be the recognition that if foreign
governments provide an implicit or explicit "too-big-to-fail" backing to
their banks, those banks would enjoy an artificially lower cost of capi-
tal than U.S. banks, despite being subject to nominally equal capital
requirements (assuming, of course, that market participants believe
that OLA will work as intended). U.S. banks have also tried to portray
their systemic importance as relatively less than that of foreign
banks, 20 4 given that the assets of the five largest U.S. banks represent
56% of the U.S. GDP, whereas the top three banks hold assets worth
337% of the GDP in the UK, 237% in France, and 84% in Germany.
20 5
In its proposed rule, the FRB seems to have ignored these con-
cerns,20 6 which is likely to invite strong feedback from banks during
the comment period. Whether the FRB will hold its ground in the
final rule remains to be seen.
Along similar lines, banks have expressed great concern over how
regulators will implement the LCR and NSFR requirements, arguing
that the permissible types of assets are too limited, that the measure-
ments are too crude, and that retail-deposit-heavy banks, while not
necessarily safer than counterparts that finance themselves differently,
202 Financial Regulatory Reform Hearing, supra note 41, app. at 80 (statement of Sheila C.
Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
203 See, e.g., Tom Braithwaite & Patrick Jenkins, JPMorgan Chief Says Bank Rules "Anti-
US". FIN. TIMES (London) (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/905aeb88-
dc50-lleO-8654-00144feabdc0.html#axzzlkElKLGc5 (reporting JPMorgan CEO Jamie
Dimon's criticism of Basel III as being against U.S. economic interests); Spencer Jakab,
"The Plot" Against America's Biggest Lenders, FIN. TIMES (London) (Sept. 16, 2011), http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4959ca56-dfcf-1 eO-bldb-001 44feabdcO.html#axzzl bM3vvlR8
(citing U.S. bank concerns); Joe Nocera, Banking's Moment of Truth, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2011, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/O6/21/opinion/21nocera.html
(reporting that U.S. House Financial Services Committee members expressed concern that
proposed U.S. capital regulations would harm the competitiveness of U.S. banks).
204 See, e.g.,Jakab, supra note 203 (discussingJamie Dimon's contentions regarding the
relative systemic importance of U.S. and European banks).
205 Tyler Durden, Presenting Total Bank Assets as a Percentage of Host Countries' GDP, ZERO
HEDGE (Feb. 17, 2010, 2:01 PM), http://www.zerohedge.com/article/presenting-total-
bank-assets-percentage-host-countries-gdp.
206 See SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLET LLP, REFLECTIONS ON DODD-FRANK: A LOOK BACK
AND A LOOK FORWARD 13-15 (2011), available at http://www.stblaw.com/pdf/Reflections
OnDoddFrank.pdf (summarizing FRB's rationale behind supporting the SIFI surcharge).
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will receive unfair advantages. 20 7 But because both standards will be
subject to an observation period to see if adverse, unintended conse-
quences result, and because regulators will be allowed to make adjust-
ments as necessary,20 8 these fears seem misplaced.
Whereas there may be legitimate debate as to the details regard-
ing LCR and NSFR, the undeniable role of liquidity shortages during
the last crisis should leave no doubt that institutions need robust li-
quidity standards of some form. Having adequate capital, after all,
does not inoculate financial institutions from liquidity struggles: a
panic among depositors and other short-term creditors can still
render a well-capitalized institution insolvent within a very short pe-
riod of time. One prominent example is Cleveland's National City
Bank, formerly one of the top five largest U.S. banks by assets. 20 9 Na-
tional City had raised more than enough capital by late 2008 to with-
stand the crisis, but regulators nonetheless forced it into a Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP)-facilitated acquisition by PNC due to
crippling liquidity problems.210
C. Over-the-Counter Derivatives
1. The Financial Stability Board Proposal
At the Pittsburgh Summit, the G-20 agreed that "[a]ll standard-
ized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or elec-
tronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through
central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest."211 Until this summit,
OTC derivatives had been virtually unregulated, but the role of deriva-
tives in AIG's monumental collapse revealed the need for more trans-
parency and oversight of those products. 212 The G-20 also stipulated
that "OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade reposito-
ries [and that] [n]on-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to
207 See Jim Brunsden, Basel Liquidity Rules May Bite Harder than Capital Thresholds,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 22, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-
22/basel-liquidity-rules-may-bite-harder-than-capital-thresholds.html.
208 Press Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Basel III Rules Text and Results of the
Quantitative Impact Study Issued by the Basel Committee (Dec. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.bis.org/press/p101216.htm.
209 National City Bank, ENCYCLOPEDIA CLEV. HIsT., http://ech.case.edu/ech-cgi/arti-
cle.pl?id=NCB (last updated Oct. 13, 2009).
210 See The PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-4), at 35-36, 41
(Nov. 10, 2008) (noting that after a mid-2008 capital infusion, "National City's regulatory
capital ratios were among the highest of large U.S. banks," but that the systemic adversity
in September increased "liquidity pressures on National City in particular," leading to its
acquisition by PNC via TARP).
211 G-20, Leader's Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, supra note 13, at 9.
212 See Joanna Slater, Ignorance of Derivatives Spurred AIG Fall, GLOBE & MAIL (Ont.,
Can.) (June 30, 2010), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/ignorance-
of-derivatives-spurred-aig-fall/articlel 624574/.
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higher capital requirements. '" 213 It asked the FSB and relevant FSB
members to assess the implementation of these mandates on a regular
basis and to determine whether the implemented measures actually
improve derivative market transparency, lessen systemic risk, and pro-
tect against market abuse. 214
Unlike in the area of resolution authority, where the FSB has
taken a more prescriptive role in setting forth standards for the G-20
to consider and approve at subsequent meetings, in the OTC deriva-
tives area, the G-20 jurisdictions are essentially drawing up their own
frameworks based on the high-level principles agreed upon at Pitts-
burgh. 215 This approach is even more different from the treatment of
capital and liquidity standards, where G-20 members are, at least so
far, implementing the Basel III standards with only minor varia-
tions. 216 The FSB effectively has a monitoring role with respect to
OTC derivative reform, publishing periodic progress reports and re-
leasing recommendations on practical issues that authorities may face
in implementation. In its reports, it also tracks international work-
streams on particular OTC derivative standard products, such as capi-
tal charges for noncentrally cleared OTC derivatives at the Basel
Committee and coordination of central clearing requirements by the
International Organization of Securities Commissions.21 7
In its first progress report, in April 2011, the FSB highlighted a
number of divergences among major jurisdictions. Conceding that
"ultimately there likely will be a range of jurisdictional approaches
taken," the FSB has decided to focus on three areas in future assess-
ments: (1) determining the degree to which jurisdictions meet G-20
commitments; (2) highlighting areas that need future coordination;
and (3) flagging areas where differences in approaches may lead to
regulatory arbitrage or interjurisdictional conflicts. 218 The FSB,
clearly concerned that key implementation efforts have stalled, took a
sterner tone in its October 2011 report, stating that "any doubt should
be removed over the applicability of the G-20 commitments relating
to central clearing and reporting to [trade repositories] for
standardised derivatives that are moved onto organised platforms." 21 9
Whether this kind of admonishment, without any tangible penalties,
213 G-20, Leaders' Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, supra note 13, at 9.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
217 See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS: PROGRESS REPORT
ON IMPLEMENTATION 1-4 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_1 10415b.pdf.
218 See id. at 7.
219 FIN. STABILITY BD., OTC DERIVATIVES MARKET REFORMS: PROGRESS REPORT ON IMPLE-
MENTATION 14 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publica-
tions/r_1 1101 lb.pdf.
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will be enough to spur jurisdictions that are lagging remains to be
seen. At present, though, the role of supranational institutions in co-
ordinating OTC derivatives reforms is plainly inadequate.
2. The United States Approach
Congress addressed OTC derivatives in Title VII of Dodd-Frank,
assigning the SEC and the CFTC the task of engaging in numerous
rulemakings that have proven very difficult to manage so far.2 20 Once
fully implemenfed, though, Dodd-Frank will result in a vastly altered
landscape for OTC derivatives markets. They will be regulated by
mandatory clearing and electronic trading of a broad range of stan-
dardized contracts, limitations on the ability of institutions receiving
federal assistance to deal in derivatives, stringent regulatory obliga-
tions for major derivative-market participants and dealers, and tighter
position limits for both listed and unlisted commodity derivatives. 221
The U.S. Congress erred in opting not to combine the SEC and
the CFTC into a single market regulator in Dodd-Frank; years of inno-
vation in financial markets and products have long since blurred the
functional distinction between their traditional mandates.222 Now,
the two agencies straddle an uncertain divide in the field of OTC de-
rivatives regulation: Dodd-Frank assigns jurisdiction for "swaps" to the
CFTC, "security-based swaps" to the SEC, and so-called "mixed swaps"
to the agencies' joint jurisdiction. 223 The agencies still have not de-
cided on a precise definition of these terms, as Dodd-Frank re-
quires.224  Moreover, the agencies' proposals on a number of
rulemakings have resulted in a number of inconsistencies, despite
Congress's explicit direction to the agencies to harmonize their
approach. 225
Accordingly, market participants remain in the dark as to
whether, how, and to what extent their derivatives businesses will be
regulated. At present, the broad definitions of "swaps" and "security-
based swaps" cover the types of OTC derivatives that are most widely
traded, including credit-default swaps, commodity swaps, total-rate-of-
220 See Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 26 ("Although Title VII
contemplated a general effective date of July 16, 2011, most of the required rulemakings
have not been finalized and, in some cases, remain to be proposed.").
221 See id.
222 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIEs REGULATION 62 (11th ed.
2009) ("This expansion in the scope of futures trading beyond agricultural products and
other commodities produced friction [between the CFTC and] the SEC.").
223 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 712(a)(8), (b)(1), (b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 8302(a)(8), (b)(1),
(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2010); Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 27.
224 Dodd-Frank Act § 712(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 8302(d)(1); Dodd Frank: One Year Later
Memo, supra note 43, at 27.
225 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 712(a)(1)-(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 8302(a)(1)-(2); Dodd Frank:
One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 2.
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return swaps, and interest-rate swaps, as well as most foreign exchange
instruments. 226 While Dodd-Frank formally excludes a number of
other derivatives from its coverage, 227 the SEC and the CFTC may be
able to regulate those derivates under antievasion authority.
228
Definitional challenges also inhere in Dodd-Frank's prescription
of regulated entities. Most rules promulgated under Dodd-Frank will
apply to "swap dealers" (SDs) and "major swap participants"
(MSPs).229 SDs generally cover swap or security-based swap dealers,
market-makers, or any other entity that regularly enters into swaps or
security-based swaps "with counterparties as an ordinary course of bus-
iness for its own account."2 30 In other words, most of the entities that
have central roles in the swap markets will easily qualify as SDs. The
concept of the MSP is more disaggregated, containing several inde-
pendent bases for regulating entities that do not qualify as SDs but
nonetheless have a significant presence in swap markets.231 Under
proposed rules, these bases generally subject non-SDs to regulation as
MSPs if they maintain substantial positions in certain types of swaps or
security-based swaps or create systemically significant counterparty ex-
posure risk due to swap activity.23 2 The agencies' proposals for defin-
ing SDs and MSPs contain highly detailed, multifactor tests that may
prove cumbersome to apply in practice. Of notable contention is how
SD and MSP requirements should apply to interaffiliate transactions
and to situations in which a single corporate entity includes multiple
SDs or MSPs as subsidiaries or branches-a particular concern when
that entity has active cross-border operations.2 33
Beyond the question of which entities and products are subject to
OTC derivatives regulation, Dodd-Frank also imposes an array of sub-
stantive requirements. While most of these requirements are outside
the scope of this Article, a handful have potentially significant interna-
tional implications. The first such requirement is the so-called "push-
out" provision, which will prohibit SDs and MSPs from receiving cer-
tain kinds of federal assistance, such as FDIC insurance and access to
226 Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 27.
227 These include puts, calls, and other options on securities; indexed debt securities
and depository instruments; futures; spot contracts; and non-financial commodity forwards
that are theoretically intended for physical settlement. Id.
228 The SEC and CFTC have signaled that future rulemakings will clarify exclusions for
a wide range of financial products, including certain forward contracts, insurance con-
tracts, and loan participations. Id.
229 See id. at 2.
230 Dodd-Frank Act § 721 (a) (49), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1670 (2010)
(amending Commodity Exchange Act § la, 7 U.S.C. § la (2006)).
231 Id. § 721 (a) (33), 124 Stat. at 1663 (amending Commodity Exchange Act § la).
232 Id.
233 Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 29-30.
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the FRB discount window. 2 34 When this provision comes into effect in
July 2013, it could create an uneven competitive and regulatory land-
scape between U.S. and foreign swaps dealers and participants, given
the importance that markets may place on the availability of such
emergency support measures.235 However, several limits on the push-
out requirement could partially limit its potential to cause cross-bor-
der conflict. Notably, the provision does not actually prohibit swaps
activity in institutions that are eligible for federal assistance, meaning
that the restrictions would only come into play when institutions actu-
ally request federal assistance.236 Furthermore, the provision contains
a number of exemptions for insured depository institutions, including
situations where institutions use swaps activity only for hedging pur-
poses or where they restrict swaps activity to certain low-risk
securities. 23 7
The mandatory clearing requirement in Dodd-Frank is another
area with cross-border ramifications. Dodd-Frank allows regulators to
require certain swaps or security-based swaps to be cleared, provided
that they allow a thirty-day notice and comment period and consider a
number of statutorily required factors injustifying their decision. 238 It
remains to be seen how regulators will actually exercise this authority
and whether they will attempt to coordinate with foreign counterparts
so that market participants are subject to a consistent set of clearing
requirements across jurisdictions. While the mandatory clearing re-
quirement does allow a limited exception for certain nonfinancial end
users (generally, nonfinancial entities that use swaps for hedging
only), the scope of this exception remains ambiguous and needs clari-
fication in rulemaking.239
If a central clearing party does not clear swaps, Dodd-Frank re-
quires that regulators impose margin requirements on SDs and
MSPs. 240 Similar to the push-out and mandatory-clearing areas, lack
of international harmonization in margin requirements for non-
cleared swaps could allow for regulatory arbitrage or create uneven
234 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(a), 15 U.S.C. § 8305(a) (Supp. IV 2010).
235 See Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 32-33.
236 Dodd-Frank Act § 716(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 8305(b)(1).
237 The "push out" provision also will not prevent an insured depository institution
(IDI) from having a swaps entity affiliate provided that (1) the IDI is part of a bank or thrift
holding company supervised by the FRB and (2) the swaps entity affiliate complies with
several other provisions in the Federal Reserve Act (among other requirements that may
be deemed appropriate by the FRB, CFTC, or SEC). Dodd-Frank Act § 716(b) (2) (B), 15
U.S.C. § 8305(b) (2) (B); Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 33.
238 Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675 (2010)
(amending Commodity Exchange Act § 2, 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
239 Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 34.
240 Dodd-Frank Act § 731, 7 U.S.C. § 6s (amending Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1-26 by inserting new § 4s(e)(2)); see also Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo,
supra note 43, at 37.
[Vol. 97:10831124
THE LIMITS OF "NAME-AND-SHAME"
obligations for market participants. Several key areas of contention
relate to margin requirements. First, U.S. agencies have signaled that
they will set the initial margin much higher than current market con-
ditions would dictate and will allow only a limited set of instruments to
be used as collateral, including cash, Treasury securities, and agency
securities. 241 While the AIG experience indicates that the collateral
limitations are a sound idea,242 the wisdom of increasing margin levels
substantially only makes sense if it is done in concert with peer juris-
dictions, given the ease of circumvention in such a fluid area of finan-
cial markets. Furthermore, critics have expressed liquidity-related
concerns over the proposed requirement that SDs and MSPs segre-
gate initial margin and over the lack of exemptions for interaffiliate
transfers. 243 And crucially, U.S. agencies possibly may apply margin
requirements to transactions between foreign subsidiaries of U.S. enti-
ties registered as SDs or MSPs, even where the U.S. parent has not
guaranteed the obligations of the subsidiary. 244
3. The European Union Approach
Because of the lengthy process involved in formulating and final-
izing EU regulations, the European reforms in the area of OTC deriv-
atives are still in a relatively inchoate stage. Although the U.S.
rulemaking and implementation process regarding OTC derivatives is
quite delayed, as discussed above, Dodd-Frank's statutory framework
still remains, and it sets forth the general parameters of the U.S. ap-
proach, from which regulators have limited ability to depart.24 5 By
comparison, the EU bodies are not as constrained in how they may
define the substantive scope of OTC derivatives regulation, provided
they can reach agreement through the Lamfalussy Process, as dis-
cussed above. 246
Pursuant to the G-20 high-level recommendations, the EC issued
a draft resolution on OTC derivatives, trade repositories, and central
counterparties in September 2010. This resolution, the European
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), aims at centralizing and ad-
ding transparency to derivatives trading and clearing. 247 If approved
by the full European Parliament, EMIR will implement: (1) a report-
241 Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 37.
242 See HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE
OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 192, 205 (2010) (noting that AIG's credit default swaps
would be insufficiendy collateralized if AIG was downgraded or if the securities it insured
lost value).
243 Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 38.
244 Id.
245 See supra Part II.C.2.
246 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
247 Financial Regulatory Reform in the European Union Memo, supra note 58, at
12-13.
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ing obligation for all OTC derivatives; (2) a clearing obligation for
certain OTC derivatives; (3) rules to mitigate operational and
counterparty credit risk for bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives; (4) a
common set of rules for central counterparties and trade repositories;
and (5) provisions addressing the establishment of interoperability be-
tween central counterparties.248 EMIR will likely also give the Euro-
pean Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)-one of the newly
formed ESAs, as discussed above-responsibility for overseeing the
European derivatives markets, including interfacing with national reg-
ulators as appropriate. However, the role that ESMA will play within
colleges of supervisors is still unclear.
Since the EC proposed EMIR, the European Parliament and Eu-
ropean Council of Ministers have been in negotiations over several
areas of contention. Before the Parliament can approve and finalize
an EC proposal, the Council must first agree with its terms-this is the
standard procedure for EU legislation regarding financial services reg-
ulation. 249 In May 2011, a European Parliament committee approved
EMIR with a number of important amendments. 250 Perhaps most no-
tably, it proposed that clearing obligations apply only to OTC deriva-
tives while reporting obligations apply to all derivatives. 251 While this
position accords with the EC proposal and the G-20 recommendation,
it conflicts with a majority of member states on the Council of Minis-
ters that wish to extend the clearing requirement to all derivatives. 252
Importantly, the Council President has been receptive to the Commis-
sion's suggestion that EMIR mirror certain U.S. provisions, where
possible.253
Beyond EMIR, the EC's other derivatives reforms principally re-
sult from a new short-selling and CDS regulation and expansions of
several existing regulations-namely the Market Abuse Directive
(MAD) and the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)-
that had previously excluded derivatives activity. 2 5 4 These reforms
share a common high-level goal of targeting manipulation and im-
proving transparency in derivatives markets. 25 5 In the United States,
concerns over short-selling and speculation were last prominent in
2008; first in the early- to mid-2008 stretch of extreme volatility and
248 Id.
249 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
arts. 294, 322, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF.
250 See Financial Regulatory Reform in the European Union Memo, supra note 58, at
13.
251 See id.
252 See id. at 14.
253 See id.
254 See id. at 14-18.
255 See id. at 15-16.
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spikes in commodities prices,2 56 and then later in the year as troubled
banks experienced precipitous declines in their share values. 257 In
Europe, however, such concerns have reemerged in the context of the
sovereign debt crisis. 258
With respect to MAD, most respondents to the EC's June 2010
consultation agreed that MAD should be expanded to cover manipu-
lative acts in derivative trading, but they differed somewhat on the
details, specifically whether regulators should consider the likelihood
of price sensitivity in defining inside information for commodity deriv-
atives.259 The alternative is to consider the expectations of market
users, which is the current criterion.260 MiFID's expansion entails far
more detailed rulemaking than does MAD's; with a general aim of
improving transparency and oversight of commodity derivatives, the
proposed changes to MiFID set forth a complex and comprehensive
set of requirements regarding trade reporting.261 The proposed
short-selling and CDS regulation, meanwhile, would impose a number
of new disclosure obligations on holders of short positions, with re-
quirements keyed to the nature of the underlying security-whether it
is a public company's stock or a sovereign instrument, for instance-
and the size of the position as a percentage of share capital. 262 This
regulation also proposes certain limitations on naked shorts
and would allow EU or member state authorities, in consultation
with ESMA, to impose additional requirements in exigent
circumstances. 263
4. Key Tensions
The lack of detailed prescription from either the FSB or the Basel
Committee has led to a number of areas where OTC derivatives regu-
lation will likely conflict between the United States and the EU. Put
simply, regulators have not heeded the G-20's call for the develop-
ment of a single, international framework.
First, the scope of derivative products and market participants to
be covered will probably be significantly different in these twojurisdic-
256 Clifford Krauss, Commodity Prices Tumble, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at Bi.
257 Emergency Order Pursuant to Section 12(K)(2) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, 73 Fed. Reg.
54875 (Sept. 17, 2008).
258 Press Release, European Parliament, Parliament Seals Ban on Sovereign Debt Spec-
ulation and Short Selling Limitations (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/201111151PR31525/20111115IPR31525 en.pdf.
259 See Financial Regulatory Reform in the European Union Memo, supra note 58, at
15.
260 See id.
261 Id. at 16-18.
262 Id. at 18-19.
263 See id. at 19.
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tions, pending final SEC and CFTC rulemaking and EMIR legislation.
Much turns on how the U.S. agencies ultimately define "swap" and
"security-based swap," and how the EU process resolves the question
of whether all derivatives, not just OTC derivatives, are subject to its
regulatory regime. At present, though, it appears that both regimes
will cover the major categories of OTC swaps, including credit default,
interest rate, currency, commodity, and equity.2 6 4
And while Dodd-Frank defines the covered entities as "swap deal-
ers" and "major swap (or security-based swap) participants," there is
no comparable categorization in EMIR or MiFID. 265 MiFID addresses
swap dealers but EMIR does not, and neither of these frameworks reg-
ulates swap participants. 266 If this gap persists, European market par-
ticipants may refuse to deal with U.S. counterparties if doing so would
bring them under the aegis of Dodd-Frank requirements. Given the
global, highly integrated nature of derivatives business, substantial dis-
junctions between the definitional coverage of U.S. and EU regula-
tions would create immense compliance challenges for businesses, as
well as opportunities for arbitrage. Along similar lines, both jurisdic-
tions should ensure that their defined exemptions do not discrimi-
nate against foreign entities. A prominent example of such
discrimination is the U.S. push-out requirement, under which the de-
pository institution exception currently would not apply to uninsured
U.S. branches of foreign banks. 267 To the extent possible, agencies
should seek to mitigate the effects of this carve-out in the rulemaking
process.
An open question in both the United States and EU concerns
which products must be cleared. Here, the legal frameworks seem to
provide a flexible means for cooperation between the SEC, the CFTC,
and ESMA. In the United States, Dodd-Frank stipulates that the SEC
and the CFTC must designate the products to be cleared; likewise,
EMIR requires clearing of a list of eligible products. 2 6 8 Yet even if the
agencies consult and agree to a relatively similar list of products, a
potential gap with respect to exemption of nonfinancial end users re-
mains. The U.S. laws allow this kind of exemption in certain cases,
whereas the proposed EU system would not, so long as an "eligible
264 See Greene & Grosshandler, supra note 144, at 2; Memorandum from Shearman &
Sterling LLP, Proposed US and EU Derivatives Regulations: How they Compare 4 (Nov.
10, 2010), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/84c83ccc-2a2d-4e20-
880c-45c31 c6059ea/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/aI 3fc03b-2189-413c-9cel-0b06
6c5d27fl/FIA-1 1101 0-Proposed-US-and-EU-Derivatives-Regulations.pdf.
265 Greene & Grosshandler, supra note 144, at 2.
266 See id.
267 See Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 33.
268 See Greene & Grosshandler, supra note 144, at 2.
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product" is at issue.269 The United States also restricts its clearing re-
quirements to standardized swaps, whereas the EU may go further.
270
The controversial and important issue of margin requirements
adds another dimension to the concerns about products that are not
subject to central clearing. 271 The EU has already set up a regime for
margin requirements, requiring both financial and eligible nonfinan-
cial counterparties to adopt risk management procedures for margin-
ing, with daily marks-to-market and provisions for collateral exchange
or equivalent holding of capital.2 72 In the United States, Dodd-Frank
requires swap dealers and major participants to post an initial and
variation margin for uncleared swaps, but regulators have not yet
promulgated implementing rules.2 73 FRB Governor Tarullo has
voiced support for establishing a common minimum margin require-
ment for noncleared derivatives, 274 and this idea should be pursued.
Central counterparty (CCP) oversight is an additional area where
close cooperation may be difficult but necessary. Dodd-Frank did not
prescribe specific regulations regarding central counterparties, as-
signing the CFTC and the SEC to issue rules to that end.27 5 So far, the
U.S. agencies have proposed rules on ownership limits and indepen-
dent director roles.276 In the EU, however, EMIR vests member-state
regulators with authority to pass rules on CCP issues.2 77 Although
ESMA will have oversight powers in this respect, 278 the decentraliza-
tion of CCP rulemaking in the EU may pose hurdles to transatlantic
harmonization. Tensions are already emerging in this area. For in-
stance, the United States puts limits on ownership of central
counterparties, whereas EU jurisdictions do not.279 Furthermore, as
CCPs grow in number and complicate the process of multilateral net-
ting, jurisdictions may need to cooperate to devise a mechanism for
CCPs to facilitate netting.
269 See id.
270 See id. at 1-2.
271 See id. at 2-3.
272 See id. at 3.
273 Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 37.
274 See Financial Regulatory Reform Hearing, supra note 41, app. at 197 (statement of
Daniel K Tarullo, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
275 See Dodd Frank: One Year Later Memo, supra note 43, at 34.
276 See Greene & Grosshandler, supra note 144, at 3.
277 See id.
278 See id.
279 See DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DERIVATIVES,
CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES AND TRADE REPOSITORIES: COMPILATION OF BRIEFING NOTES,
PARL. EUR. Doc. PE 451.488, at 19 (2011), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
document/activities/cont/201103/20110324ATT1 6422/20110324ATT1 6422EN.pdf;
Greene & Grosshandler, supra note 144, at 3.
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III
BEYOND "NAME-AND-SHAME": A TAILORED APPROACH TO
FoRmALIzING REGULATORY COOPERATION
A. A Treaty-Based Framework for Coordinating Supervision and
Resolution of G-SIFIs
The largest financial institutions have only grown larger since the
2008 crisis, creating systemic risks that are extremely difficult to relia-
bly supervise and resolve through a voluntary or consensus-based sys-
tem of cooperation. In fact, many of those institutions share this view,
as evidenced by the fact that a majority of the G-SIFIs that submitted
comments to the FSB on its effective resolution regime blueprint,
along with a number of national banking associations, criticized the
FSB for not pushing for a treaty arrangement or other legally binding
measures between jurisdictions. 280 The FSB rejected these sugges-
tions, however, concluding that the "[d]evelopment of more binding
mechanisms will not be feasible without first putting in place the con-
vergent regimes and incentives to cooperation" that its suggested re-
forms will deliver.281
This response misapprehends at least two critical dynamics. First,
the political window for agreeing to and implementing legally binding
frameworks in this area is likely limited, and that window may well
close by the time "convergent regimes" and "incentives to coopera-
tion" are instituted. Second, institutions and investors greatly desire
some degree of predictability as to how G-SIFI failures will be han-
dled, and voluntary arrangements simply fall short on that score.
In sum, major jurisdictions must take a more uniform approach
to supervision and resolution than they currently do. Although the
FSB's guidance on key elements of effective resolution regimes is an
important starting point, it will likely be insufficient to ensure the
seamless legal coordination that will be necessary in future crises. Fur-
thermore, the current form of the supervisory college system is too
weak to have any real impact in enhancing coordination between reg-
ulators on a routine basis, much less in a crisis situation. Indeed, to
the extent that the Basel Committee's guidance shapes the function-
ing of supervisory colleges in practice, the lack of any formal require-
ments or institutional mechanisms makes it unlikely that they will
serve a meaningful role in supervising G-SIFIs. If colleges of supervi-
sors are simply in a position to encourage national authorities to share
280 For a list of the G-SIFIs that commented, see Comments Received on the FSB Consulta-
tive Document on Effective Resolutions of SIFIs, supra note 24. The associations calling for le-
gally binding measures include the Institute of International Finance, the European
Banking Federation, the British Bankers' Association, the French Banking Federation, the
Italian Banking Association, and the Hong Kong Association of Banks. Id.
281 FSB, Overview of Responses, supra note 80, at 3-4.
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information, they will have a difficult time maintaining a comprehen-
sive view of the particular institutions at issue. 282
Instead of relying solely on supervisory colleges and national su-
pervisory agencies, major jurisdictions should create a treaty-based
framework to coordinate the efforts of G-SIFI supervisors and resolu-
tion authorities. To clarify, we are not advocating the creation of
stand-alone international administrative bodies to conduct supervi-
sion, as Professor Eric Pan envisions,283 nor do we support the crea-
tion of similar bodies to execute resolutions, as the proposed ERA
would do. 28 4 Rather, we suggest that a treaty create an institutional
forum, perhaps at the FSB, where national regulatory authorities can
actively cooperate on G-SIFI oversight. To facilitate and formalize
those efforts, the treaty would create procedures for the creation and
regular revision of detailed, institution-specific supervision and resolu-
tion plans that would be negotiated by-and have the force of law
between-relevant national authorities for each G-SIFI. 285
These binding agreements should go beyond the crisis manage-
ment groups and resolution agreements that the FSB envisions and
encompass supervisory colleges as well. If employed correctly, supervi-
sory colleges can help detect and remedy solvency-threatening issues
before they become serious. Conversely, the lack of effective cross-
border prudential supervision that supervisory colleges could have
provided during the U.S. financial crisis, as Pan has observed, ren-
dered the international financial architecture "unable to prevent fi-
nancial instability in the US from becoming a global financial
crisis." 28 6 Thus, as important as it is to coordinate recovery and reso-
282 The 2008 Fortis Bank insolvency illustrates this problem. To deal with the insol-
vency, the Belgian, Luxembourgian, and Dutch supervisors agreed to a plan to purchase
49% of Fortis's common equity, yet several days after their agreement, the Dutch govern-
ment unilaterally seized the Dutch subsidiary, abandoning the cooperative effort and
breaking up the institution. Alford, supra note 27, at 65-66; see also Press Release, Fortis,
Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands Invest EUR 11.2 Billion in
Fortis (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.bnpparibas-ip.co.id/file/ulasanpers/
080929-UKPRFortis.pdf.
283 Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial
Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 243, 246-47 (2010).
284 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
285 The jurisdictions to include in the cooperative framework should be determined
from several vantage points. On one hand, consideration should obviously be given to
which jurisdictions pose firm-wide significance to the G-SIFI; that is, those whose unilateral
action would render a resolution or recovery plan ineffective. But from a less appreciated
angle, policymakers should also consider a way to include input from emerging jurisdic-
tions where a G-SIFI dominates the national banking sector (even with that activity com-
prising a small percentage of the G-SIFI's global business) given that those jurisdictions
would almost certainly ring-fence assets if that G-SIFI were to fail. This is especially true
where the collective effect of ring-fencing by such jurisdictions could pose a material obsta-
cle to a G-SIFI's recovery or resolution.
286 Pan, supra note 283, at 246.
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lution measures for G-SIFIs, focusing solely on those policies while
neglecting divergences in supervisory practices will increase the likeli-
hood that regulators will need to take last-option measures.
In particular, the supervisory aspect of institution-specific agree-
ments should provide for regular interaction, confidentiality protec-
tions, and coordinated analysis between national authorities
responsible for major subsidiaries. Ideally, it would also allow for col-
laborative participation in examinations by national supervisors, as
suggested by FRB Governor Tarullo, provided that sufficient informa-
tion sharing guidelines and protections could be put in place. 28 7
Such transparency and engagement would provide a powerful disin-
centive to lax supervision. If, for instance, host jurisdictions believed
that the home jurisdiction was doing ineffective work in a consoli-
dated supervisory role, they could impose higher capital requirements
on the business units they supervised. As the AIG meltdown demon-
strated, deficiencies or undue risks in one small unit of a global finan-
cial institution, if undetected and unaddressed, can metastasize
quickly and threaten the viability of an entire firm. 288
These agreements also offer U.S. and foreign regulators the op-
portunity to minimize conflicts in recapitalization and other recovery
measures for each institution. As noted earlier, there is an ongoing
debate among major jurisdictions as to whether recapitalization in-
struments should be implemented, and if so, whether they should be
statutory or contractual in nature.28 9 As Paul Tucker of the Bank of
England has pointed out, these instruments can take different
forms-featuring "high" or "low" triggers-and can be used in a vari-
ety of combinations.29 0 If harmonization is not possible on this mat-
ter, regulators from home and key host jurisdictions should at least
287 Financial Regulatory Reform Hearing, supra note 41, app. at 201 (statement of Daniel
K Tarullo, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
288 At the time of its collapse in September 2008, the core insurance operations of
AIG, then the world's largest insurance company, were well regulated and solvent; a small
unit based out of London, AIG Financial Products, had gotten the parent company in
trouble by writing massive CDS contracts on mortgage backed securities. Due to collateral
calls on those CDS and AIG's imminent downgrade as the credit crisis intensified after
Lehman Brothers' failure, the company faced a massive liquidity shortage that would have
quickly bankrupted the company without government intervention. PAULsON, supra note
242, at 194-221 (2010).
289 Generally, contingent capital bonds convert to equity when they cross a preset
threshold of firm-specific or industry-wide losses. Bail-in capital, by contrast, would convert
to equity upon a regulatory determination (as guided by statute). See RamyaJaidev, CoCos
Offer Banks More Hope than Bail-In: CentralBanking. com Pane4 CENTRALBANKING.COM (Dec. 7,
2010), http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking/news/1930621/cocos-offer-
banks-hope-bail-cen tralbankingcom-panel.
290 See Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Fin. Stability, Discussion of Lord Turner's Lec-
ture, "Reforming Finance: Are We Being Radical Enough?", Remarks at Clare Distin-
guished Lecture in Economics, Cambridge (Feb. 18, 2011), in BANK OF ENGLAND, http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/201 1/speech477.pdf.
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have a global view of whether, when, and how recapitalization mea-
sures will likely be used or triggered within a given institution.
But even with the most carefully crafted institution-specific agree-
ments, national authorities still may diverge in executing them, espe-
cially as a G-SIFI nears insolvency and recovery and resolution matters
are on the table. Accordingly, the treaty framework should also estab-
lish a dispute-resolution mechanism-again, likely based at the FSB-
with some form of meaningful penalty, so as to ensure that regulators
are not gridlocked in the midst of a crisis. How to best structure this
mechanism is a difficult and sensitive question, as the decision maker
would likely need to be able to resolve a dispute within an extremely
short period of time-a matter of days or even hours. Despite the
institutional design difficulties, a dispute-resolution mechanism is a
necessary feature and should be the subject of further debate and
inquiry.2 91
B. A Model Law for Recognition of Resolution Authority Action
Further, policymakers should consider going beyond the FSB's
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions292
and craft a model law for the international recognition of resolution
authority action, drawing on the UNCITRAL work on cross-border
corporate insolvencies. 293 The IMF General Counsel proposed such
an approach in a 2010 memorandum, noting that while certain as-
pects of the corporate model may not apply, others would be very rele-
vant.2 9 4 These include the concepts of center of main interest, powers
for different insolvency representatives to collaborate, nondiscrimina-
tion against foreign creditors, specific cooperation protocols for indi-
vidual cases that specify leadership roles and modalities of interaction,
291 The established international dispute resolution bodies, such as those of the WITO,
do not operate under critical time constraints, thus limiting their relevance as a model for
the FSB-based mechanism proposed here. In January 2012, however, a new arbitral forum
called the Panel of Recognized International Market Experts in Finance (PRIME) was
formed in The Hague as a place to resolve complex and time-sensitive financial disputes.
Its rules are based primarily on the UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules, but they allow parties to
agree to short timelines and to request certain urgent provisional measures (such as the
appointment of an "Emergency Arbitrator," selected from a pre-approved list of experts).
Although PRIME's envisioned "fast track" process, which is projected to take a minimum of
thirty days, would not be as short as a G-SIFI resolution would require, it could still develop
into a rough template for the kind of expedited dispute resolution process suggested
above. See PRIME Finance: A New Dispute Resolution Option for the Financial Sector, HERBERT
SMITH (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/B5284DAC-9923-4F
98-9688-9A78F6BA8115/0/PRIMEFinance.html; About P.R.I.M.E. Finance Arbitration Rules,
P.R.I.M.E. FIN., http://www.primefinancedisputes.org/index.php/arbitration (last visited
Apr. 16, 2012).
292 FSB, KEY AI rIBUTES, supra note 73.
293 IMF, RESOLUTION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKS, supra note 23, at 16-17.
294 Id. at 15-16.
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and the ability to grant relief to foreign representatives on a discre-
tionary basis (with limitations).295
While the U.S. and the EU resolution models will presumably
converge with the FSB proposal in broad terms, the risk remains that
residual statutory gaps could hinder cooperation in a time of crisis.
The above comparison of the United States' OLA with the EU's devel-
oping framework suggests that at least some material differences will
persist.29 6
As numerous banks have argued in comments to the FSB, it
would be most effective for home resolution authorities-if possible-
to lead the resolution process on a global, group-wide basis. 297 Even if
this kind of resolution arrangement were stipulated to in institution-
specific cooperation agreements, a UNCITRAL model law system
would nonetheless be of great value in addressing any national statu-
tory barriers that may otherwise emerge in the execution of group-
wide resolutions.
Specifically, under a UNCITRAL-like system for financial institu-
tion insolvency, the home resolution authority could petition the reso-
lution authorities in host jurisdictions to be recognized as the foreign
main proceeding, provided it could demonstrate that it was the
"center of main interest" for the insolvent institution.298 If this status
were established, the home resolution authority could ensure nondis-
crimination among the institution's creditors and gain legal authority
to collaborate and coordinate with foreign insolvency representatives,
among other powers. In particular, the UNCITRAL-like system would
guarantee that home resolution authorities could transfer assets and
liabilities, wherever located in a G-SIFI's worldwide operations, to a
bridge-holding company without violating local law in host
jurisdictions.
Because of the time pressures involved with financial resolutions,
the "center of main interest" determination process must be adminis-
trative rather than judicial (as distinguished from the UNCITRAL pro-
cess for cross-border corporate insolvencies, where a judicial
determination is required). Along similar lines, should a prospective
FSB-based dispute-resolution mechanism issue a ruling in the midst of
a crisis-for instance, to compel a recalcitrant home jurisdiction to
commence the cooperative recovery or resolution of a G-SIFI, as stipu-
lated in the institution-specific agreement-it is essential that national
administrative authorities in all relevant jurisdictions in which the G-
295 Id. at 17.
296 See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
297 See FSB, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, supra note 78, at 13-16.
298 IMF, RESOLUTION OF CROSS-BORDER BANWs, supra note 23, at 17.
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SIFI does business already have full legal power to execute those mea-
sures in a coordinated and seamless manner.299
C. A Validation Body for Capital and Liquidity Methodologies
As matters currently stand, major jurisdictions have signaled their
intention to implement Basel Ill-or some form thereof-into na-
tional law and regulation. 300 But given the political and industry pres-
sures against Basel III, as discussed above, complete and consistent
implementation of the new standards should not be taken for
granted. The most likely scenario of divergence would unfold as a
"race to the bottom," with one jurisdiction believing that the other
had cut corners in implementing an aspect of Basel III and, in defense
of its home institutions' competitive position, lessening its own stan-
dards in response. 30 1
Accordingly, the viability of the new capital and liquidity mea-
sures will depend on rigorous monitoring, detecting, and remedying
of noncompliance with the agreed-to standards. This is a difficult task
for several reasons. Beginning with Basel II, as noted above, capital
standards have begun to rely more heavily on banks' internal model-
ing of market and credit risk, which frequently lack transparency and
can differ substantially between institutions and jurisdictions. 30 2
Moreover, the opacity of banks' balance sheets, driven in part by the
proliferation of complex financial instruments in recent years, com-
pounds the regulatory challenge in monitoring both capital and
liquidity. 303
The institution-specific cooperation agreements suggested above,
if they enabled home and host supervisors to engage in collaborative
examinations of individual G-SIFIs, could be of considerable benefit
in facilitating consistency and transparency within each institution.
But an additional mechanism is necessary to ensure uniform imple-
mentation of the new standards among different G-SIFIs. As bank
analysts have recently noted, for instance, there are currently substan-
299 As former WTO Legal Affairs Director Bruce Wilson has found in his study of
WTO-member-state compliance with adverse dispute settlement body findings, the speed
with which states comply depends greatly on whether they can effect changes through
administrative rather than legislative action. Wilson, supra note 25, at 399.
300 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
301 See Stefan Walter, Sec'y Gen., Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Address to the
Financial Stability Institute at the Conference on Basel III: Basel III: Stronger Banks and a
More Resilient Financial System 5 (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/
speeches/sp110406.pdf ("[T]he failure to implement Basel III in a globally consistent way
will again lead to a competitive race to the bottom and increase the risk of another crisis
down the road.").
302 Financial Regulatory Reform Hearing, supra note 41, app. at 199 (statement of Daniel
K. Tarullo, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
303 Id.
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tial disparities in asset risk weighting between U.S. banks and foreign
counterparts that are not explained by differences in accounting stan-
dards or institutional risk profiles. 30 4 Furthermore, bank supervisors
have been unable to discern the precise reasons for this gap due to
the complexity and opacity of banks' balance sheets and risk
models.30 5
If this situation persists, it could well undermine institutional and
governmental confidence in the Basel III process and prevent full and
consistent implementation of its standards. With this possibility in
mind, FRB Governor Tarullo has wisely proposed that Basel's Stan-
dards Implementation Group (SIG) institute strong and transparent
frameworks for effective cross-country monitoring.30 6 Tarullo argues
that "this process should go beyond traditional stocktaking exercises
to include a careful assessment of the methodologies" that national
regulators use to assess banks.30 7 In his view, the SIG must develop a
mechanism to validate the "actual risk-weighted assets calculated by
individual banks. '"308
Major jurisdictions should give strong consideration to creating
this kind of validation body in some form, whether it be located within
Basel's SIG or instituted as part of the treaty-based framework we sug-
gest above. In either case, the validation body should be empowered
to review and rate the capital and liquidity position of each G-SIFI's
subsidiaries and branches, and it should be allowed to publicly high-
light noncooperative jurisdictions and institutions upon findings of
capital and liquidity deficiencies that national authorities do not
remedy.309
D. A Mutual Recognition Approach for Over-the-Counter
Derivatives
Unlike supervision and resolution, which demand close interna-
tional coordination to address potentially time-sensitive deteriorations
of G-SIFIs and to counteract unilateral impulses in such situations, a
formal, treaty-based structure is not necessary for effective cross-bor-
der regulation of OTC derivatives. Instead, the initial goal should be
to achieve a system of substantive convergence between key jurisdic-
tions, with an eye to creating the requisite conditions for a multilateral
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 200-01.
307 Id. at 201.
308 Id.
309 To ensure the fairness of this process, policymakers could consider establishing a
confidential appeal procedure within the FSB to allow national regulators to challenge
capital or liquidity findings they consider erroneous.
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mutual recognition regime with oversight and administration through
the FSB.
Under mutual recognition agreements, one state agrees to recog-
nize that another state's regulation is a suitable substitute for its
own. 31 0 Although the EU has long used mutual recognition in its in-
ternal market policies, the United States has used it far more spar-
ingly-the only agreement in recent years was between the SEC and
its Australian counterpart on the regulation of broker-dealers and ex-
changes.311 As Professor Pierre-Hugues Verdier has argued, there are
certainly drawbacks to mutual recognition, most notably enforcement
and verification problems, given that states are effectively reliant on
each other to maintain the regulatory standards set forth in the agree-
ment.31 2 But for OTC derivatives, the case for mutual recognition
seems to outweigh those potential risks, which can be mitigated in
several ways.
Most significantly, the fact that the FSB and national authorities
are effectively creating a regulatory regime from whole cloth is a point
in favor of mutual recognition. OTC derivatives regulation marks a
vastly different challenge from resolution authority or capital and li-
quidity regulations, where similar legal frameworks were already in
place before the regulatory reform process began.313 Compounding
the novelty of OTC derivatives regulation is the fact that it is so incred-
ibly complex and diverse, covering a range of substantially different
products and markets. Taken together, these factors indicate that
achieving harmonization in this field of regulation would take years, if
it were even possible.
Moreover, mutual recognition helps to retain a modicum of flexi-
bility in the development of financial regulation.314 Flexibility is an
attractive feature in such a new field given the relatively high
probability that unforeseen negative effects will arise when imple-
menting so many rules at once. It also better suits the dynamic and
evolving nature of the derivatives business because establishing a rigid
framework could hamper the development of products that would en-
hance the ability of governments, businesses, and investors to mitigate
risk.315
310 See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARv.
INr'L LJ. 55, 57 (2011).
311 See id. at 57-58.
312 See id. at 59.
313 While it is true that OLA and the FSB's model resolution regime are unique in
many ways, they nonetheless draw strong inspiration from the FDIC's well-established pro-
cess of resolving depository institutions and thus differ from the relatively more sui generis
nature of proposed OTC derivatives regulation.
314 See Verdier, supra note 310, at 65.
315 See Roberta Romano, Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment, in 3
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL FINACtNA INsTITUTIONs 27, 43-44 (Peter Nobel et al. eds.,
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In the short run, the financial community can address the en-
forcement problem of mutual recognition by including only advanced
jurisdictions in the arrangement, while progressively seeking to in-
clude emerging economies as their regulatory systems mature or as
their derivatives activity become systemically important. A mutual rec-
ognition agreement between the United States and the EU, for in-
stance, would be a logical starting point. Such an agreement should,
at a minimum, address licensing requirements for swaps dealers and
participants, margin requirements for specific instruments, designa-
tion of central counterparties, trade reporting requirements, and in-
formation sharing protocols. Additionally, a partial remedy to the
verification problem is to coordinate the mutual recognition regime
through the FSB and establish an independent audit mechanism
there, similar to the proposal for capital and liquidity, as discussed
above.316
CONCLUSION
Thus far, key jurisdictions have tried to coordinate financial regu-
latory reform efforts called for by the G-20 through soft-law principles
and guidance to be enacted nationally. This approach has already
yielded substantial, troubling divergences in critical areas of regula-
tion, as the foregoing discussion has demonstrated. Notwithstanding
the numerous rulemaking deadlines and the breakneck pace of na-
tional reform processes, policymakers must pause to reconsider the
global strategic picture.
This Article does not purport to cover all areas of financial regu-
lation with important international implications. Rather, the underly-
ing objective of this Article has been to illustrate that substantial
divergences in critical regulatory areas have already emerged, that
policymakers need not take a "one-size-fits-all" viewpoint on legal ar-
rangements for coordinating such regulation, and that certain areas-
G-SIFI supervision and resolution in particular-call for more formal
legal arrangements than others.
Our treaty-based proposals do not misapprehend, as some might
claim, the incentives for countries to defect from international agree-
ments in the midst of a crisis. Indeed, a principal reason to create
formal mechanisms for supervisory collaboration and independent
validation of standards implemention is to minimize the likelihood
that recovery and resolution will be needed in the first place. But
2010) (contending that financial innovation in derivatives, enabled by the lack of rigid
regulatory harmonization, has created "substantial social value by lowering transaction
costs and permitting efficient risk-sharing").
316 See id. at 59 (noting that states delegate monitoring to collective institutions to miti-
gate verification problem).
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even where crises do emerge, having committed to a treaty framework
for resolutions will enable states to safeguard against their own ten-
dencies to grant forbearance to home institutions, obtain a source of
legitimacy for taking corrective action if they are host to a troubled
institution (and the home jurisdiction is uncooperative), and provide
a central process to facilitate and demand cooperative measures dur-
ing difficult, time-sensitive situations.
Even though these measures, like any treaty arrangement, cannot
provide an absolute guarantee of state compliance, we must recall that
the current system of voluntary commitments provides effectively no
deterrence to noncooperation in times of crisis. As the events of 2008
demonstrated, that system yielded an unpredictable, disorganized,
and value-destroying response to G-SIFI failure. At the very least, insti-
tuting a form of our treaty proposal will raise the legal and reputa-
tional costs of unilateral action, thus creating a more powerful
inducement for states to cooperate as compared to the status quo. By
extension, our proposal will provide markets with greater certainty as
to how regulators will handle the resolution and recovery of G-SIFIs.
At a fundamental level, policymakers must not lose sight of the
glaring inadequacy of piecemeal national regulation in overseeing the
complex global activities of G-SIFIs. The discordant and often disas-
trous handling of G-SIFI failures in the last crisis should raise serious
concerns about the current, domestically oriented approach to re-
form, notwithstanding G-20 efforts. This is not to discount the impor-
tance of sovereignty and national control over financial companies,
which are very important to many national economies. Rather, as this
Article has argued, the value of sovereignty in global financial regula-
tion is no longer absolute and must be weighted-on a strategic, tai-
lored basis-against countervailing costs of unilateral action.
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